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 Against moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially 
justified, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues that moral intuitions are unreliable and must be 
confirmed to be justified (i.e. must be justified inferentially) because they are subject to cognitive 
biases. However, I suggest this is merely a renewed version of the argument from disagreement 
against intuitionism. As such, I attempt to show that the renewed argument is subject to an 
analogous objection as the old one; many cognitive biases of moral intuitions result from biases 
of non-moral judgments. Thus, the unreliability of moral intuitions due to biases (and the reason 
inferential justification was required) can be removed by clearing up the non-moral biases. 
Accordingly, biases of moral intuitions do not threaten a slightly qualified version intuitionism 
which posits non-inferential justification of intuitions when non-moral biases are not present. I 
also present an empirical study that lends initial support to my argument. 
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1 
Introduction 
 Torture. Incest. Abortion. Honesty. The list of things that evoke our moral intuitions 
seems endless. Many, like incest, seem obviously wrong to all of us. And surely honesty, in 
general, is good. But people have diverging intuitions about torture and abortion. Our various 
moral intuitions are an important part of our everyday experience. We form moral intuitions 
when we read the news, watch our favorite television program or movie, and interact with, or 
even just observe those around us. These moral intuitions seem to occur without warning, 
without reflection, and without our control; yet we generally trust their accuracy without 
question. We have the strong impression that our moral intuitions track the moral truth, even 
though they often conflict with the intuitions of other people. 
 But what is the proper epistemic role of such moral intuitions? Are they justified? Ought 
we accept our intuitions so easily, or at all? One answer is given by the thesis of moral 
intuitionism (intuitionism, for short), which is a version of foundationalism in moral 
epistemology. Intuitionism holds that some moral intuitions, qua moral beliefs, are justified non-
inferentially; that is, “some believers are justified in holding some moral beliefs independently of 
whether the believer is able to infer those moral beliefs from any other beliefs” (Sinnott-
Armstrong 2006a, 185). The intuitionist believes that moral intuitions provide the foundation for 
moral knowledge, the bedrock from which other moral beliefs can be justified. 
 This thesis has recently come under fire by what I will call “the argument from cognitive 
biases” put forth by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, who wields evidence of cognitive biases of moral 
intuitions against the intuitionist (2006a; 2006b; 2008a; 2008b). A cognitive bias occurs when a 
cognitive process (like making a decision or forming a judgment, belief, or intuition) is affected 
by purportedly irrelevant properties of the situation being judged. For example, framing effects 
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are one type of cognitive bias whereby “decision makers respond differently to different but 
objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem”—just changing the wording of a 
question, without changing the content of the question itself, can make a person form different 
beliefs, and respond differently (Levin et al. 1998, 150). When a cognitive process is biased in 
this way, it is not reliable. As Sinnott-Armstrong notes, this “follows from the very idea of 
cognitive biases” (2008a, 52). Sinnott-Armstrong argues that since many moral intuitions are 
highly susceptible to cognitive biases, moral intuitions are unreliable. Some moral intuitions or 
types of moral intuitions may be reliable, even though moral intuitions in general are unreliable 
(just as some Fords may start reliably, even though Fords in general may be unreliable if many 
do not start reliably). But for Sinnott-Armstrong, if a class of intuitions is unreliable, then one is 
justified in accepting a given intuition from that class just in case she can confirm the intuition. 
Imagine that our intuitions about Fords starting are unreliable—perhaps we are often convinced 
by Ford’s advertisements that their cars will start, when in fact they often do not. If we ought to 
know that these intuitions are unreliable, Sinnott-Armstrong would suggest that one is justified in 
her intuition that a given Ford will start just in case she can confirm that intuition. That is, in case 
she can confirm that the Ford will start, perhaps by providing evidence that she has started it 
many times before without incident. And confirmation of an intuition justifies the intuition 
inferentially; her intuition is justified because can infer the belief that the Ford will start from the 
evidence that she has started it many times before. Since confirmation of an intuition justifies the 
intuition by making a person able to infer the intuition from the confirming evidence, 
confirmation provides inferential justification (see Section 2.1). Thus, the argument from 
cognitive biases goes, since moral intuitions are unreliable and accordingly require moral 
confirmation (i.e. confirmation of the moral intuitions) to be justified, they cannot be non-
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inferentially justified. Therefore, intuitionism, which holds that some moral intuitions are 
justified non-inferentially, is false. 
 The argument from cognitive biases is a recent line of argument against intuitionism, and 
moral intuitionists have yet to offer an adequate reply. In this thesis I will not aim to defend 
moral intuitionism against rival moral epistemological theories; rather, I aim only to point out 
that the argument from cognitive biases involves a hidden premise, which is false. There may be 
good reasons to reject intuitionism, but the argument from cognitive biases is not one of them, 
and I will attempt to show why here. I will resurrect an intuitionist response to an old argument 
against intuitionism, the argument from disagreement, and adapt that response to the argument 
from cognitive biases (Mackie 1977; Loeb 1998; Sinnott-Armstrong 2002, 2006a, 2006b). I will 
show that the argument from cognitive biases requires the plausibly false premise which states 
that the cognitive biases (and unreliability) of moral intuitions are not grounded in cognitive 
biases (and unreliability) of non-moral judgments. By non-moral judgments, I mean people’s 
relevant perceptions or representations of the non-moral facts of the situation—which can be 
conscious or represented in subconscious processes. They are relevant in that they are about the 
non-moral facts that affect the formation of moral intuitions about the situation (like judgments 
about future consequences). Biases of these non-moral judgments may be caused by subtle 
changes in the salience of certain non-moral facts, which the subject is not even aware of. Also, 
biases of non-moral judgments may be short lived and easily changed (e.g. when the subject 
focuses her attention on different information). 
 I will suggest that cognitive biases, like framing effects, influence people’s moral 
intuitions largely because they influence such non-moral judgments; that is, framing effects 
influence people’s judgments about the non-moral facts of the case. The idea is that most 
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differences in a subject’s moral intuitions about different, but objectively equivalent 
presentations of the same situation are due to differences in her non-moral judgments about the 
different presentations of the situation. And as Sinnott-Armstrong notes in the context of the 
argument from disagreement, “when disagreements about moral issues arise solely from non-
moral disagreements and conceptual confusions that could be removed by further inquiry and 
reflection, informed and rational people would not disagree” (2006a, 199). This same principle 
applies to the argument from cognitive biases, in that when differences in a person’s moral 
intuitions are grounded in differences in her non-moral judgments, resolving the difference in 
non-moral judgments would resolve the difference in moral intuitions (i.e. would remove the 
cognitive biases of moral intuitions). In this case, moral confirmation is not required for one’s 
moral intuitions to be justified. Since non-moral confirmation removes the biases of moral 
intuitions, such non-moral confirmation can allow one’s moral intuitions to be justified. And, 
unlike moral confirmation, non-moral confirmation does not threaten intuitionism because one 
cannot infer her moral intuitions from non-moral confirmation (on pain of inferring an ought 
from an is). Thus, if the cognitive biases and unreliability of moral intuitions are grounded in 
cognitive biases and unreliability of non-moral judgments, then the biases of moral intuitions can 
be eliminated and the original reason for thinking those intuitions were unreliable is gone. 
Accordingly, by confirming the relevant non-moral judgments, our moral intuitions could be 
justified without making those intuitions inferable. Thus, our moral intuitions can be justified 
non-inferentially (barring some reason other than cognitive biases to question their reliability). 
The argument from cognitive biases does not threaten the moral intuitionist who claims that 
moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially when biases of non-moral judgments do not 
occur. 
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 The empirical research cited by the argument from cognitive biases to show that moral 
intuitions are unreliable leaves open the possibility that the biases of moral intuitions are 
grounded in biases of subjects’ non-moral judgments. And I will argue that, to a significant 
extent, this is the case—many biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral 
judgments. I will also present a study I conducted in collaboration with Eddy Nahmias that 
supports my claim. 
 In Section 1, I will motivate the topic by introducing the thesis of intuitionism. Then, in 
Section 2, I will review the argument from cognitive biases. In Section 3, I will show how it 
parallels the argument from disagreement against intuitionism, and highlight the intuitionist’s 
response from the non-moral basis of disagreement, which holds that many moral disagreements 
are grounded in non-moral disagreements. Then, in Section 4, I adapt the intuitionist’s response 
from the non-moral basis of disagreement to respond to the argument from cognitive biases—
offering a response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions. In Section 
5, I will discuss an empirical study Eddy Nahmias and I conducted that weighs in favor of my 
response. I offer some concluding remarks in Section 6. 
 
1 Skepticism and intuitionism 
 
 Moral epistemology is the branch of metaethics that studies moral knowledge, beliefs, 
and justification. The central problems facing the moral epistemologist are whether and how 
moral claims can be known and moral beliefs can be justified. For our discussion of intuitionism, 
issues about the justification of moral beliefs will be central, so we will forgo a discussion of 
moral knowledge. In a recent paper, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong explained justification of moral 
beliefs quite simply: a moral belief is justified when “the believer ought to hold that belief as 
opposed to suspending belief, because the believer has adequate epistemic grounds for believing 
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that it is true” (2008a, 48).1 Much of the difficulty comes in specifying what epistemic grounds 
count as “adequate”. But intuitionism is a thesis designed to respond to a more fundamental 
problem with the justification of moral beliefs raised by the skeptic: perhaps no moral belief is 
ever justified because of a vicious skeptical regress. The skeptical regress gets started by 
assuming that the justification of moral beliefs must be inferential: 
Inferential justification—S is inferentially justified in believing B 
if, in order to be justified in believing B, S must be able to infer B 
from another justified belief, B`.2 
The problem here is that if justification must be inferential, then S can only be justified in 
believing B`, the belief which justifies her belief in B, if S has the ability to infer B` from another 
justified belief, B``. And S must be able to infer B`` from another justified belief B```, and so on. 
In this way, on the assumption that moral beliefs can only be justified inferentially, the 
justification of moral beliefs falls into a vicious regress. 
 The moral intuitionist’s answer to this regress is, as Sinnott-Armstrong aptly puts it, 
“simply to stop” (2006a, 184). Intuitionism flatly rejects the assumption that moral beliefs can 
only be justified inferentially, and thus holds that at least some moral beliefs can be justified 
non-inferentially: 
Non-inferential justification—S is non-inferentially justified in 
believing B if, in order to be justified in believing B, S does not 
need to be able to infer B from any other belief. 
Although S might have the ability to infer B from B`, S is non-inferentially justified in believing 
B when she is justified independently of her ability to infer B from other beliefs. As Brad Hooker 
                                                 
1 There certainly are alternative ways to understand justification, and one might object to Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
argument form cognitive biases by disagreeing with him at this early stage. I think, however, that Sinnott-
Armstrong’s argument fails on a more fundamental level, in that it requires a false hidden premise, and thus I will 
largely follow Sinnott-Armstrong’s understanding of the relevant concepts. 
2 It is important to note that, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, to be justified in believing B inferentially, S does not 
actually need to make the inference of B from some other belief; S needs only to be able to draw this inference. The 
idea is that “the requisite information [must] be encoded somehow” in S’s brain at the right time (Sinnott-Armstrong 
2006a; Hooker 2002). 
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puts it, “a moral belief can be justified by some feature other than its inferential relations with 
other beliefs” (2002, 163).3 Intuitionists differ in their theories of what that “other”, justifying 
feature of moral intuitions is (reliabilism, Shafer-Landau 2003; moral experientialism, Tolhurst 
1990; reflectionism, Audi 2004). But all intuitionists share the thesis that certain moral beliefs 
can be justified (in some way) non-inferentially. This general thesis will be the topic of the 
present discussion. Such intuitionism is a version of foundationalism in moral epistemology; the 
moral beliefs that are justified non-inferentially provide a foundation for the inferential 
justification of other moral beliefs. In this way, epistemological moral intuitionism provides a 
stopping point for the skeptical regress—it ends at the non-inferentially justified moral beliefs. 
The belief B might be justified by being inferred from the justified belief B`, but if B` is justified 
non-inferentially, then the regress has lost its viciousness. 
 As Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a) notes, intuitionists also disagree about the content of the 
beliefs that can be justified non-inferentially: are they about what is good (Moore 1903), or what 
is right (Ross 1930)? And they disagree about the generality of the beliefs: are they beliefs about 
abstract principles (Sidgwick 1907), generalizations (Ross 1930), or particular actions (Prichard 
1968)? Still, they agree that the non-inferentially justified beliefs are, unsurprisingly, moral 
intuitions. To be precise, I will follow Sinnott-Armstrong in defining a moral intuition as “a 
strong, immediate moral belief” (2008a). By ‘strong’, Sinnott-Armstrong means that one would 
not easily give up the belief; by ‘immediate’, he means that the belief is formed non-
inferentially. That is, “a belief’s status as an intuition consists in its being arrived at not by 
                                                 
3 I may sometimes refer to a belief being justified, but this is only shorthand for saying that the believer is justified in 
holding the belief (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a). 
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inference from other moral beliefs” (Hooker 2002, 162).4 The idea is that a moral belief is an 
intuition when it is not formed based on any actually performed inference, regardless of whether 
the believer is able to infer the moral belief from other (moral or non-moral) beliefs. So a given 
intuition may be “accessible via inference”—that is, one might, in fact, be able to infer it from 
other beliefs—but moral intuitions in general need not bear inferential relations to other beliefs 
(Hooker 2002, 162). They are intuitions just in virtue of their not being formed inferentially.  
 A point worth noting that seems to have been largely ignored in the contemporary 
discussion of epistemological moral intuitionism is that this definition of ‘moral intuition’ is 
quite different from the one offered by some classic intuitionists, like G.E. Moore.5 So we are 
right to ask how these notions of intuitions differ, and how they might be related. Moore thought 
of a moral intuition more generally as a non-inferentially justified (not formed) moral belief (I 
will call such moral intuitions “Moorean moral intuitions”; 1903). In Principia Ethica, he is quite 
explicit in this, saying “when I call such propositions ‘Intuitions,’ I mean merely to assert that 
they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition 
of them” (1903). As you can see, in contrast to the definition of intuition above, Moore clearly 
meant to imply nothing about the way the beliefs or propositions are formed in calling them 
intuitions. A Moorean moral intuition could be formed via inference, or not—but it certainly was 
not provable or justifiable via inference. But Moore then needs to say just which (if any) moral 
beliefs can be non-inferentially justified: Which moral beliefs are or can be Moorean moral 
intuitions? The contemporary definition of moral intuition differs from Moore’s in that it builds 
an answer to this question into the definition. The moral beliefs that can be Moorean moral 
                                                 
4 It is not particularly relevant to our discussion, but Hooker suggests this immediacy (being formed or “arrived at” 
non-inferentially) is all there is to being an intuition. Since we will be discussing Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument on 
his own terms, we will follow him in adding that the belief must be ‘strong’. 
5 Andrew Altman pointed out this oversight to me.  
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intuitions are the ones that are formed non-inferentially, and those are what are currently being 
called moral intuitions (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a; Hooker 2002). Moore certainly objected to 
this answer to the question of which moral beliefs can be Moorean moral intuitions. He thought 
it was not just any moral belief that is formed non-inferentially that could count as a Moorean 
moral intuition (i.e. a moral intuition that can be justified non-inferentially), but rather only those 
moral beliefs that are formed after due reflection and with sufficient expertise. Specifically, 
Moore wanted to talk about the moral beliefs or propositions offered by the “ethical 
philosopher”—that is, the ‘moral expert’ (1903; see specifically the Preface). 
 But for epistemological moral intuitionism, there is a serious flaw in this attempt to 
identify which moral beliefs can be Moorean moral intuitions, or can be justified non-
inferentially. The problem is that expert moral beliefs, such as the belief that M (some expert 
moral belief), can be justified inferentially based on the fact that they are expert. That is, the 
expert belief that M can be justified by inferring it from some reason that expert beliefs are 
epistemically superior (like the fact that they are more reliable than other beliefs), and that an 
expert believes that M. And thus, expert beliefs as a class of moral beliefs defined by their being 
‘expert’ cannot form the class of Moorean moral intuitions. The expert class of moral beliefs is 
distinguished by its being superior epistemically, and this fact makes the beliefs it contains 
inferentially justifiable (from the fact that they are part of an epistemically superior class). 
 One will always need to offer some reason that justifies distinguishing expert beliefs 
from other beliefs as the beliefs that can be Moorean moral intuitions (i.e. the beliefs that can be 
justified non-inferentially), like the fact that they are reflected upon more closely, that they are 
more reliable, or that they are more rational. But whatever the reason, it will make one able to 
inferentially justify the expert beliefs. Indeed, the reason needs to make one able to inferentially 
10 
justify the expert beliefs, or else it would not be a good reason to distinguish those beliefs as 
potential Moorean moral intuitions. Imagine if the above reason that expert beliefs are superior 
was not that they are more reliable, but that they sound cooler; this would not be a good reason to 
think that expert beliefs are Moorean intuitions, and it also would not provide inferential 
justification of the expert beliefs. One could not inferentially justify an expert’s belief that M by 
reasoning from the fact that it sounds cooler. But if sounding cool was a good reason to think 
expert beliefs are Moorean intuitions, then, indeed, sounding cool could provide inferential 
justification of expert beliefs by plugging the reason (sounding cool) into the inferential equation 
above; the expert belief that M can be justified by inferring it from the fact that expert beliefs are 
epistemically superior because they sound cooler, and that an expert believes that M. The point is 
that any good epistemic reason to distinguish a subset of moral beliefs as candidates for Moorean 
moral intuitions also provides inferential justification of that subset of beliefs, and thus precludes 
the subset from being the class of Moorean moral intuitions. A given expert moral belief may be 
a Moorean moral intuition—but no subset of moral beliefs can be justifiably identified on 
epistemic grounds, such as their being expert, as being the class of Moorean moral intuitions. To 
put it another way, some expert beliefs may be Moorean moral intuitions, but this cannot be in 
virtue of their being “expert,” as such an epistemic virtue makes them inferentially justifiable 
(and thus not Moorean intuitions). 
 It seems to me that it is for this reason that contemporary intuitionists in moral 
epistemology define moral intuitions as moral beliefs that are formed non-inferentially—and 
hold that these are the candidates for Moorean moral intuitions. By defining moral intuitions in 
this way, they can avoid the folly of offering an epistemic reason for identifying a certain class of 
moral beliefs as Moorean moral intuitions. 
11 
2 The argument from cognitive biases 
 
 In a recent paper, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong offers what I have called “the argument from 
cognitive biases” against intuitionism, which I will suggest is merely a renewed version of the 
argument from disagreement (2008a). Sinnott-Armstrong wields evidence from empirical 
psychology suggesting that moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases to argue that moral 
intuitions are unreliable, must be confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially 
justified—and thus that intuitionism is false (2008a). I will discuss the parallel with the argument 
from disagreement in more detail later, but for now, notice that whereas the argument from 
disagreement argues that moral intuitions are unreliable on the basis of between-subject 
differences in moral intuitions (i.e. moral disagreements between different people or groups), the 
argument from cognitive biases argues that moral intuitions are unreliable on the basis of within-
subject differences in moral intuitions. That is, it argues on the basis of cognitive biases which 
make it likely that a single person will have inconsistent intuitions about different, but 
objectively equivalent or relevantly similar moral situations. (I will refer to between-subject 
disagreement simply as moral disagreement, and within-subject disagreement as cognitive 
biases.) 
 To be precise, I define a cognitive bias as a tendency for a cognitive process, like the 
formation of moral intuitions, to be affected by purportedly irrelevant properties of a stimuli; and 
this susceptibility to modification by irrelevant factors reveals the cognitive process to be 
unreliable. For example, a cognitive bias might make it likely that a person will have different 
moral intuitions about effectively equivalent moral scenarios or dilemmas presented using 
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different words.6 Take Sinnott-Armstrong’s example of Joseph, who would believe that Marion 
is fast when told that she runs one hundred meters in ten seconds, but would believe that she is 
not fast (and is slow) when told that she runs one hundred meters in ten thousand milliseconds 
(2008a). Since Joseph would form such drastically different beliefs about running speed in 
objectively equivalent situations, his beliefs about (Marion’s) running speed, in general, are not 
reliable. Perhaps his beliefs about ‘running speed in seconds’ are reliable, and only those about 
‘running speed in milliseconds’ are unreliable (maybe because he thinks that one millisecond is 
one thousand seconds, rather than one thousandth of a second). Nonetheless, his beliefs about 
running speed, in general, are unreliable (since beliefs about ‘running speed in milliseconds’ are 
inaccurate and are part of the class of his beliefs about running speed). To show the unreliability 
of moral intuitions, Sinnott-Armstrong cites a variety of framing effects, cognitive biases like the 
one just described in which a subject’s moral intuitions are affected by the wording used to 
describe a moral dilemma or by the order in which dilemmas are presented (2008a). Extending 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument, Thomas Naddelhoffer and Adam Feltz argue that moral 
intuitions are unreliable not only because they are subject to framing effects, but also because 
they are subject to another well-known cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry, whereby 
people’s intuitions about a scenario are affected by whether the scenario is presented in the first 
or third person context (in prep.; Malle 2006). 
 When these sorts of cognitive biases of moral intuitions occur, there is essentially a 
within-subject disagreement in moral intuitions. The same subject has inconsistent intuitions 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that biases make it likely that a given person’s intuitions will be affected by irrelevant 
factors. This means that any given person’s intuitions might be completely unaffected by irrelevant factors; the bias 
merely makes it likely that her intuitions will be so affected. 
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about different presentations of objectively equivalent scenarios. Assuming non-relativism,7 at 
least one of the inconsistent intuitions must be wrong, and thus at least some moral intuitions are 
fallible. If such cognitive biases, or within-subject moral disagreements, are sufficiently 
prevalent, then the reliability of moral intuitions as a class of beliefs would be called into 
question, since that class would include all of the inconsistent pairs of beliefs (half of which are 
mistaken); one could not rely on her moral intuitions (i.e. could not say that her moral intuitions 
reliably track the moral truth), since so many of them would be mistaken. 
 Sinnott-Armstrong argues that if moral intuitions are unreliable due to cognitive biases in 
this way, then moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified—since without 
confirmation there would be no way to know if a given intuition is one of the accurate or 
inaccurate ones in the class of moral intuitions (2006a; 2008a; 2008b). The problem is that 
confirmation of a moral intuition can justify that intuition only on inferential grounds. This is 
because the confirmation justifies the intuition by making the person able to infer her intuition 
from the confirming evidence (recall the Ford example discussed in the Introduction; see Section 
2.1). Thus, if cognitive biases of moral intuitions (i.e. within-subject moral disagreement) are 
sufficiently prevalent to bring the reliability of moral intuitions into question, moral intuitionism 
is false; moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified, and thus cannot be justified 
non-inferentially. To put it explicitly, the argument from cognitive biases looks like this:8 
C1) If moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases 
to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, then 
moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified 
                                                 
7 I will be objecting to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from cognitive biases while granting his non-relativist moral 
realism, which holds that there are objective (non-relativist) moral facts. He says, “I believe that many acts are 
morally wrong. I think that my positive moral beliefs are true and correspond to moral facts” (2006a, 58). I am 
aware the one could object to his arguments by rejecting these assumptions; but I believe his argument can be 
objected to even granting his assumptions. 
8 This is my formulation of the argument, reconstructed from Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a; 2008b; 2006a. I believe it 
accurately represents Sinnott-Armstrong’s main argument provided in 2008a in light of the expanded version of the 
argument presented in 2008b and his views on confirmation made explicit in 2006a (see especially Chapter 9). 
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(because without confirmation, a believer is not justified in 
believing her intuitions were formed reliably rather than 
unreliably, and thus she is not justified in believing those 
intuitions) 
C2) If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be justified, 
then they can only be justified inferentially. 
C3) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then 
moral intuitionism is false. 
C4) Moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases to 
show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.9 
C5) Moral intuitionism is false. 
 
 Most of the action occurs in premises C1, C2, and C4. Premise C3 is straightforward, 
since intuitionism just claims that some moral intuitions can be justified non-inferentially. In 
Section 2.1 I will discuss why, as premise C2 suggests, confirmation of moral intuitions provides 
only inferential justification of those intuitions. In section 2.2 I will look at premises C1 and C4 
in more detail. In Section 2.3 I will examine exactly why Sinnott-Armstrong thinks that premise 
C4 is true, reviewing the evidence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, and I will assess the 
status of C4 in Section 2.3.5. In 2.4 I discuss a potential initial objection which rejects the 
argument’s internalist bias. In Section 3, I will discuss the intuitionist’s objection to the argument 
from disagreement—that most moral disagreement is grounded in non-moral disagreement—
which I adapt as a response to the argument from cognitive biases in Section 4. 
 
2.1 Confirmation of moral intuitions justifies inferentially 
 
 Premise C2 above says that if moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified, 
then they can only be justified inferentially. This is because, on Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
understanding, confirmation of a belief provides only inferential justification of that belief 
(2006a). Confirmation makes a person justified in holding a belief because she can infer her 
belief from the evidence that confirmed it. For example, say that Mary believes that Andy 
                                                 
9 The intuitions are not just unreliable, but we ought to know that they are unreliable. This just means that we ought 
to be aware of the truth of C4—i.e. of the prevalence of cognitive biases.  
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Pettitte, who plays baseball for the New York Yankees, took steroids (call this belief S), and she 
believes S because a rival Red Sox fan told her so. Her belief came from a biased, unreliable 
source and she knows it, so she is not justified in believing S without confirmation of S. When 
Mary sees Pettitte on ESPN later that evening confirming his steroid use, she is now justified in 
believing S, that Pettitte took steroids. And the key is that this confirmation justifies Mary’s 
belief that S inferentially; she is justified because after receiving confirmation of S, she now has 
the ability to infer S from that confirmation. That is, Mary can infer S, that Pettitte took steroids, 
from the fact that he admitted taking steroids. In this way, confirmation of a belief provides 
justification of that belief just because a believer can infer the belief from the confirming 
evidence. 
 
2.2 Cognitive biases create the need for confirmation 
 
 If moral intuitions require confirmation to be justified, then since confirmation provides 
only inferential justification, moral intuitions could be justified only inferentially. Premise C1 
states that sufficient cognitive biases of moral intuitions would create a need for such 
confirmation of moral intuitions. Sinnott-Armstrong notes that “confirmation is needed for a 
believer to be justified in holding a belief that other people deny or doubt, when the believer has 
no reason to prefer one believer to the other” (2006a, p. 193). His point here about between-
subject disagreement creating the need for confirmation applies analogously to within-subject 
disagreement (like cognitive biases) creating the need for confirmation. A believer cannot be 
justified in believing one intuition over an incompatible one without some reason or 
confirmation that supports one or the other intuition, because there would be no way to know 
which intuition ought to be relied on (Smythe and Evans 2007). And this is the case whether the 
incompatible intuitions are from two different people, or the same person under different 
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conditions as in the case of cognitive biases. For example, imagine a between-subject 
disagreement between Mary and Patty. While Mary believes S (that Andy Pettitte took steroids) 
Patty believes ~S (that Andy Pettitte did not take steroids). Both women are equally informed, 
having the same evidence, but they have based their differing beliefs on different character 
assessments of Brian McNamee (the trainer who accused Pettitte of taking steroids). Mary thinks 
McNamee is trustworthy, while Patty thinks he is a liar. Without any confirmation of one of their 
beliefs to suggest one belief over the other, neither can be justified. They would need to know 
who is a more reliable judge of character, or have some other confirmation of one of their 
beliefs, in order for that belief to be justified. In this way, inconsistency in beliefs creates a need 
for confirmation of those beliefs.10 
 In premise C4, however, inconsistency in moral beliefs due to cognitive biases creates the 
need for the whole class of moral intuitions to be confirmed, not just some particular moral 
intuitions. For biases to create the need to confirm a whole class of beliefs, the biases must be 
sufficiently prevalent to bring the reliability of that class of beliefs into question. To illustrate the 
point, consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s thermometer analogy (2002). Imagine you have a hundred 
very old thermometers, and you know that some of them are inaccurate. If a sufficient amount of 
them are inaccurate, then you are not justified in trusting the temperature readings of any one 
thermometer until you confirm whether it is accurate or inaccurate—this group of thermometers 
would be unreliable. The same goes for classes of beliefs; if a sufficient amount of a certain class 
of beliefs is mistaken or unreliable, then nobody is justified in holding a belief from that class 
                                                 
10 It should be clear that not every disagreement is one that creates a need for new or further confirmation. A 
disagreement that persists between a well-informed believer and an ill-informed believer has a need for confirmation 
or a reason to prefer one believer or the other (since there is a disagreement), but that need has been met by the fact 
that one believer is better informed than the other. The disagreement still creates the need for confirmation, but that 
need has been readily met. A reason to prefer one belief over another can be thought of as a type of confirmation of 
the belief. So confirmation is not necessary when one has a reason to prefer one belief over another because 
confirmation has already been provided by the reason. 
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without confirming that the belief is one of the accurate ones in the class—the class is unreliable. 
The amount that must be mistaken in order to demonstrate unreliability will vary depending on 
what is being shown to be unreliable, and what the risks are of being mistaken. For the 
thermometers in this case, there does not seem to be any great risk if we are mistaken about the 
temperature, so the amount of thermometers that must be inaccurate to show that the 
thermometers, as a group, are unreliable and require confirmation is probably pretty high—say 
around 15 percent of the thermometers. In the case of moral beliefs, the stakes are higher, so the 
percent of moral intuitions that must be mistaken to show that moral intuitions, as a class of 
beliefs, are unreliable and require confirmation is probably rather low—Sinnott-Armstrong 
suggests around only 5 percent (2008b). If 5 percent are inaccurate, then we need to confirm a 
given intuition for it to be justified. 
 Consider a world in which half of the population believes that using water boarding to 
torture terrorism suspects is generally morally acceptable, while the other half believes that it is 
not. Half of this world is right, and half wrong about the moral status of water boarding.11 
Considering the whole class of moral beliefs about water boarding in the population, half of the 
beliefs in that class are accurate while the other half is not. If a class of beliefs only tracks the 
truth 50% of the time, it seems clear that one should not rely on such beliefs. In order to be 
justified in relying on a moral belief about water boarding in this world, one would need to 
confirm that her belief is in the 50% of beliefs about water boarding that are accurate, rather than 
the other half. Since it is difficult to imagine what sort of confirming evidence one could find 
about her moral beliefs on water boarding, you can see why Mackie favored the skeptical 
conclusion; confirmation of one’s moral beliefs is needed, which means they cannot be justified 
non-inferentially, but no confirmation seems imminent, which suggests that they cannot be 
                                                 
11 Again, this is on the assumption of non-relativistic moral realism. 
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justified inferentially either (1977). The point against intuitionism, though, is just that some 
confirmation of one’s moral intuitions about water boarding in the imagined world is needed, 
whether it is imminent or not, in order for a believer to be justified in her belief about water 
boarding. This is because without confirmation there is a 50/50 chance that her belief is 
inaccurate versus accurate. Thus her moral belief can only be justified with confirmation, and 
can accordingly only be justified inferentially (since confirmation justifies inferentially, as 
discussed in Section 2.1). 
 Thus, for cognitive biases (or moral disagreement) to create the need to confirm moral 
intuitions in order for them to be justified, the biases (or disagreements) would have to be 
sufficiently prevalent such that the reliability of moral intuitions, as a class of intuitions, was 
called into question. And, according to the argument from cognitive biases (and from 
disagreement), if the biases (or disagreements) are sufficiently prevalent to show that moral 
intuitions are unreliable, then moral intuitions would require confirmation to be justified and 
could only be justified inferentially; that is, moral intuitionism would be false, moral intuitions 
cannot be justified non-inferentially. For Mackie (1977), Sinnott-Armstrong (2006a; 2008a; 
2008b), Stich, and many others, this is exactly what they see in the case of moral disagreement; 
disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable, and thus 
require confirmation to be justified and cannot be non-inferentially justified. Machery, Kelley 
and Stich note that “for almost any moral issue, it is possible to find people who hold opposing 
moral views” (2005). Sinnott-Armstrong says simply that “the range of disagreements among 
strongly-held non-inferable moral beliefs…shows that many moral believers are unreliable” 
(2002). But what about cognitive biases of moral intuitions? Sinnott-Armstrong argues that, 
indeed, they are sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable. 
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2.3 The empirical picture so far 
 
 So for Sinnott-Armstrong, if moral intuitions are unreliable due to cognitive biases, then 
they must be confirmed in order to be justified, they are justified only inferentially, and 
intuitionism is false. All that appears left for this argument to go through is the truth of premise 
C4. That is, what remains to be shown is that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are prevalent 
enough to show that a sufficient amount of moral intuitions are inaccurate, and accordingly that 
moral intuitions are unreliable; cognitive biases will have to be shown to affect a variety of moral 
intuitions in a variety of circumstances. To this end, Sinnott-Armstrong cites several studies of 
framing effects, which I review below in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.3 (2008a). Then in Section 
2.3.4, I will review evidence of another kind of cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry, 
affecting moral intuitions (Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.). In 2.3.5, I sum up the status of C4, 
which looks to be on solid ground. Then I review a potential objection to the argument in Section 
2.4. In Section 4 I will offer a different objection to the argument from cognitive biases 
analogous to the classic objection to the argument from disagreement from the non-moral basis 
of moral disagreement (which is reviewed in Section 3); just as the argument from disagreement 
requires that the moral disagreements are not grounded in non-moral disagreements, I will 
suggest that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument requires that the cognitive biases of moral intuitions 
must not be grounded in biases of non-moral judgments—and that it appears the biases are so 
grounded in biases of non-moral judgments. But first, I will discuss the evidence of cognitive 
biases of moral intuitions.  
 
2.3.1 Tversky and Kahneman 
 
 In a seminal paper, Tversky and Kahneman were the first to investigate framing effects. 
They presented subjects in group 1 (N=152) with the following scenario: 
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Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two 
alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. 
Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of 
the programs are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people 
will be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981) 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
Subjects in group 2 (N=155) read the same “cover story”, but the programs had different 
consequences: 
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. 
If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will 
die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
Which of the two programs would you favor? 
Subjects then had to choose a Program between A and B (for subjects in group 1) or between C 
and D (for subjects in group 2). What is important to note is that Programs A and C are 
objectively identical, resulting in the exact same numbers of lives saved (200) and lives lost 
(400). The same goes for Programs B and D; both have a 1/3 probability that 600 lives will be 
saved, and a 2/3 probability that 600 lives will be lost.  Thus, subjects in groups 1 and 2 were 
choosing between the exact same programs, just framed in different ways: the first group’s 
programs are framed in terms of the lives that will be saved, whereas the second group’s 
programs are framed in terms of the lives that will be lost. 
 Nonetheless, 72% of subjects in group 1 chose A (and 28% chose B) while only 22% of 
subjects in group 2 chose C (and 78% chose D). Thus, the wording of the scenarios has a huge 
influence on people’s moral judgments. When the options are framed in terms of the lives saved 
people are much more likely to be risk averse; most people (72%) chose to save 200 lives and 
lose 400 lives, rather than choosing to take a chance at saving all 600 lives at the risk of all 600 
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lives being lost. In contrast, when the options are framed in terms of the lives lost people are 
much more likely to be risk taking; most people (78%) chose to take a chance at saving all 600 
lives at the risk of all 600 lives being lost, rather than choosing to save 200 lives and lose 400 
lives. While subjects’ judgments were about choosing which program should be favored, it 
seems reasonable to follow Sinnott-Armstrong in interpreting their judgments as reflecting their 
moral intuitions about the scenarios (2008a). 
 But as Sinnott-Armstrong notes, there should be little doubt that “descriptions cannot 
affect what is really morally right or wrong in this situation” (2008a); that is, wording (in terms 
of lives saved versus lives lost) is a morally irrelevant property of the stimuli. People’s moral 
beliefs should not depend on such factors.12 Accordingly, the Tversky and Kahneman study 
shows a clear example of a cognitive bias, specifically a framing effect, on moral beliefs. It’s 
clear, Sinnott-Armstrong says, that “such moral beliefs are unreliable” (2008a). But this is only 
one cognitive bias affecting moral intuitions in one set of circumstances; is there more evidence 
of cognitive biases of moral intuitions? 
 
2.3.2 Petrinovich and O’Neill 
 
 In a study by Petrinovich and O’Neill, the authors again found that “there were framing 
effects [on people’s moral intuitions] produced by differences in wording” (1996). They 
presented subjects with the standard trolley dilemma: 
 A trolley is hurtling down the tracks. There are five 
innocent people on the track ahead of the trolley, and they will be 
killed if the trolley continues going straight ahead. There is a spur 
of track leading off to the side. There is one innocent person on 
that spur of track. The brakes of the trolley have failed and there is 
                                                 
12 I, along with Sinnott-Armstrong, Tversky and Kahneman, and many others, take it that this is an apparently 
irrelevant property of the situation; the burden would be on someone who disagrees to show why it is in fact 
relevant. 
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a switch that can be activated to cause the trolley to go to the side 
track. 
 You are an innocent bystander (that is, not an employee of 
the railroad, etc.). You can throw the switch, saving the five 
innocent people, which will result in the death of the one innocent 
person on the side track. What do you do? (Petrinovich and 
O’Neill 1996) 
 Subjects were then asked to rate on an odd number scale (no zero) from -5 (strongly 
disagree) to +5 (strongly agree) how much they disagreed or agreed with each of the two horns 
of the dilemma—throwing the switch and not throwing the switch. For half of the subjects, the 
dilemma was presented in a Kill wording: “throw the switch which will result in the death of the 
one innocent person on the side track” or “do nothing, which will result in the death of the five 
innocent people.” For the other half of the subjects, the dilemma was presented in a Save 
wording: “throw the switch, which will result in the five innocent people on the main track being 
saved” or “do nothing, which will result in the one innocent person being saved” (Petrinovich 
and O’Neill 1996). Notice that the Kill and Save wording are objectively identical, and differ 
only in terms of the way the outcomes are framed. 
 As you’ve probably guessed, subjects who saw the Save wording were likely to agree 
more strongly with throwing the switch (mean agreement of +0.65 on the -5 to +5 scale) than 
subjects who saw the Kill wording (mean agreement of -0.78). People had different moral 
intuitions, depending on how the dilemma was framed—using Kill wording or Save wording. 
Since, as before, wording is a rather obvious example of a morally irrelevant property of a 
stimuli (a property that should not affect one’s moral beliefs about the stimuli), Sinnott-
Armstrong concludes that the Petrinovich and O’Neill study presents another circumstance in 
which moral intuitions are unreliable due to the effects of a cognitive bias. 
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2.3.3 Haidt and Baron 
 
 Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 highlighted examples of word framing effects on moral 
intuitions. Haidt and Baron (to their surprise) found that moral intuitions can also be affected by 
order framing effects (1996). In one experiment, they presented all subjects with two versions of 
a scenario in which Nick is trying to sell his car, 1984 Mazda MPG, to Kathy, and subjects were 
asked to rate Nick’s “goodness” in each version (from extremely bad/reprehensible to extremely 
good). In the Act version, Nick actively lies to Kathy about the year that many Mazda MPGs had 
a manufacturer’s defect so that she does not know that it happened in 1984, the year Nick’s car 
was made. In the Omission version, Kathy mentions to Nick that she thinks she heard 
somewhere that Mazda MPGs had a defect in 1983, and Nick fails to correct her (he withholds, 
or omits, the information about the correct year of the defect). Half of the subjects read and 
responded to the Omission version first and the Act version second, and the other half read and 
responded in the opposite order—Act first and Omission second. 
 Haidt and Baron found a large order effect, as “eighty percent of subjects in the omission-
first condition rated the act worse than the omission, while only 50 percent of subjects in the act-
first condition made such a distinction” (1996). So, when subjects read Omission before Act, 
they are very likely to say that Nick is worse in Act (when he actively lies) than Omission (when 
he merely withholds information). In contrast, when subjects read Act before Omission, they are 
much less likely to say that Nick is worse in Act than Omission. Haidt and Baron suggest that 
much of this effect is due to subjects who read Act first being unwilling to “‘pull back’ and 
partially excuse the omission” after rating Nick on the ‘extremely bad’ end of the scale in Act 
(1996). Thus, subjects who read Act first rate Nick in Act and Omission as quite a bad person. 
But subjects who read Omission first have no trouble excusing Nick’s omission, rating him as 
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not so bad, since they haven’t antecedently judged him to be bad in Act—and then when they 
read Act, they rate Nick as bad because it is much easier to ‘add-on’ blame than it is to ‘pull it 
back’. 
 There is probably an evolutionary story that could be told to explain why adding-on 
blame is easier than pulling it back; perhaps about how risking over-blaming others (by easily 
adding blame, and not easily taking it back) is a safe, advantageous practice. But whatever the 
best explanation of the data turns out to be, the fact is that moral intuitions about the moral status 
of Nick’s character in Act and Omission are affected by the order in which people read the two 
versions. Thus, on the assumption that the order in which moral intuitions are formed is morally 
irrelevant—i.e. should not affect the intuitions—it seems that this is another circumstance in 
which moral intuitions are unreliable due to the effects of a cognitive bias. 
 
2.3.4 Nadelhoffer and Feltz 
 
 So far we have looked at framing effects on moral intuitions, which are a specific type of 
cognitive bias whereby a cognitive process is biased by the presentation of the dilemma (e.g. 
wording or order effects). Nadelhoffer and Feltz have recently found that moral intuitions can 
also be affected by another well-known cognitive bias, the self-other asymmetry (in prep.; Malle 
2006). This is a bias which causes people to make different judgments about, or perceive 
differently, stimuli presented in the first versus third-person point of view. An example is the 
famous attribution bias in social psychology: people are likely to attribute other people’s 
behavior as deriving from their character, but likely to attribute the exact same behavior as 
deriving from external circumstances when it is their own behavior (Malle 2006). The authors in 
the present study presented subjects with the traditional trolley dilemma, almost identical to the 
one used by Petrinovich and O’Neill (1996). Half of the subjects were placed in the Self 
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condition, and saw the original dilemma, where the subject herself is depicted as performing the 
action in the dilemma (of throwing or not throwing the switch). The dilemmatic question then 
asks if it is morally permissible for “you” (the subject) to throw the switch. The other half of the 
subjects were placed in the Other condition and saw a modified version of the trolley dilemma in 
which it is another person (John) who is depicted as performing the action in the dilemma. The 
dilemmatic question then asks if it is morally permissible for “John” to throw the switch. 
 Rather unexpectedly, 65% of subjects in the Self condition judged throwing the switch 
permissible, whereas 90% of subjects in the Other condition judged throwing the switch 
permissible (Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.). That is, subjects are significantly more likely to 
judge throwing the switch to be morally permissible when it is another person who throws the 
switch than when it is the subjects themselves throwing the switch. According to Nadelhoffer 
and Feltz, “it is clear that it can’t be less morally permissible for me to hit the switch than it is for 
someone else to hit the switch—all things being equal” (in prep.). Presumably Sinnott-Armstrong 
would agree; all else being equal, the specific person who performs an action is a morally 
irrelevant property of the scenario. Thus, we have found another instance of moral intuitions 
being affected by a cognitive bias.13 
 
2.3.5 The status of premise C4 
 
 Now that we have reviewed all of the evidence offered by Sinnott-Armstrong, and some 
additional support from Nadelhoffer and Feltz, we are prepared to evaluate the status of premise 
C4, which states that moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases to show that 
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable. On Sinnott-Armstrong’s account, “together these 
                                                 
13 It may be worth noting that Nadelhoffer and Feltz explain this bias by arguing that the Self condition is more 
emotionally salient than the Other condition because the subject is actually described as being present and as 
performing the action (in prep.). They argue that this higher salience leads subjects to be more likely to reject the 
flipping the switch in Self than they are in Other. 
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studies show that moral intuitions are subject to framing effects in many circumstances” (2008a). 
And we could add that it seems that moral intuitions are subject not just to framing effects, but at 
least one other cognitive bias as well (the self-other asymmetry). Thus, Sinnott-Armstrong 
concludes that premise C4 is on solid ground. 
 There are a variety of responses that intuitionists can offer against premise C4. First of 
all, it seems clear that we have not seen evidence of anything close to “many circumstances” in 
which moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases. A handful of studies about hypothetical 
and often unrealistic dilemmas (e.g. trolley dilemmas) shows very little about whether our real 
world moral intuitions are affected by cognitive biases at all, let alone whether they are affected 
by biases in many circumstances. In a brief response to Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from 
cognitive biases, William Tolhurst noted that “the studies [cited by Sinnott-Armstrong] were 
designed to elicit framing effects in the subjects”; whereas “the situations in which we generally 
form our spontaneous moral beliefs are not” (2008). Moreover, our ordinary intuitions are not 
formed in response to verbally formulated moral questions—they are in response to perceptually 
presented stimuli (like seeing a person steal a candy bar or tell a lie) (Tolhurst 2008). The point 
is that the evidence reviewed above shows very little about our ordinary moral intuitions, 
whether or not they are affected by cognitive biases, and if they are so affected, to what extent 
they are affected. As Shafer-Landau suggests, it is fair to say “that, as yet, we simply do not have 
a sufficient number of relevant experiments to give us much indication of how many of our 
moral beliefs are subject to framing effects” (2008). Furthermore, consider the fact that while 
Petrinovich and O’Neill did report framing effects on people’s moral intuitions, the authors also 
reported that “the effects were not always large nor did they always appear” (1996). They also 
note that “the research evidence for reflection and framing effects is mixed rather than uniformly 
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positive, being dependent on differences in problem characteristics that are only partly 
understood” (1996). Considering the countless moral intuitions we form in our ordinary, day-to-
day lives—like when we read the newspaper, watch television, or gossip with friends—“mixed” 
evidence for framing effects in some laboratory experiments does not seem like evidence of our 
intuitions being biased in “many circumstances”. 
 Sinnott-Armstrong attempts to rebut this objection about insufficient evidence. He 
suggests that for moral intuitions to be justified they must have a very high degree of reliability, 
probably close to what scientists require for the justification of scientific beliefs: “if moral beliefs 
are to be justified in anything like the way scientific beliefs are justified, then it has to be 
reasonable to assign them a probability [of truth] of at least .95” (2008b). While he offers this 
general degree of reliability, he tries to avoid committing to a specific degree, or to a specific 
prevalence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions that would be required to show unreliability of 
the whole class of moral intuitions. He says simply that “if someone denies that [the empirical 
results discussed above] are large enough, then my only recourse is to recite the details of the 
studies, to invoke the high costs of mistaken moral intuitions, and to remind critics that only a 
minimal kind of [moral] confirmation is needed” (2008b, 101).14 His point is that a very high 
percentage of moral intuitions in the class of moral intuitions must be true in order for the class 
to be reliable, because our moral intuitions are too important to risk them being inaccurate. Thus, 
he suggests, the results above demonstrate that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are 
sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are unreliable. 
                                                 
14 By minimal confirmation, Sinnott-Armstrong simply means that the confirmation needed to justify the moral 
intuition does not actually need to be used to infer the intuition; for Sinnott-Armstrong, a believer’s confirmed moral 
intuition is justified so long as the believer is able to infer the intuition, even if she never actually performs the 
inference—that is, so long as she can offer the confirmation if asked, and demonstrate an understanding of the 
inferential link between the confirmation and the intuition. 
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 But Sinnott-Armstrong’s response here assumes that the moral intuitions probed in the 
studies of cognitive biases are ordinary moral intuitions. It is our ordinary moral intuitions that 
are at issue in the argument from cognitive biases, and it is not clear that the empirical studies 
cited above show any evidence that our ordinary moral intuitions are subject to cognitive biases 
at all, let alone to a sufficient degree to raise questions about their reliability. Clearly moral 
intuitions can be biased, but professional scientist’s scientific intuitions could probably be biased 
as well if they are presented with appropriate stimuli. I presume that this would not lead us to 
judge their ordinary scientific intuitions (i.e. the intuitions that they have in the lab every day) to 
be unreliable, since the stimuli used to generate the bias are likely to be far from the ordinary 
one’s that the scientists would encounter in their lab. If ordinary stimuli do generate significant 
biases of people’s intuitions, then we can draw the conclusion that ordinary intuitions are subject 
to cognitive biases, and thus, depending on the prevalence of the biases, we can assess the 
reliability of those ordinary intuitions. The evidence offered by Sinnott-Armstrong does not use 
ordinary stimuli to generate biases. And therefore, the conclusions we can draw about ordinary 
moral intuitions are limited, at best. 
 Moreover, the experiments cited have subjects making a variety of judgments, like 
choosing which program to implement or agreeing with a course of action. It takes some work to 
show that these judgments are reflective of people’s moral intuitions. Subjects’ responses likely 
reflect a variety of considerations, not just moral ones. But even if we grant the subjects’ 
responses are reflective of a moral judgment, as I mentioned briefly in Section 2.3.1, it is not 
clear that these judgments reflect moral intuitions (as we’ve defined them here) or moral beliefs. 
In order to show that the effects probed in the cited studies are biases of moral intuitions, there 
should also be evidence that the moral beliefs subjects form are moral beliefs that have not been 
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formed inferentially and that subjects are unwilling to give them up easily. Again, the empirical 
picture simply isn’t complete enough to make a determination on this issue. Despite these 
concerns, I am inclined to grant Sinnott-Armstrong the benefit of the doubt that sufficient 
evidence of cognitive biases of ordinary moral intuitions will emerge. Thinking about my own 
everyday moral reasoning, it seems certain that my moral intuitions are affected by morally 
irrelevant factors from my own mood to perceptual properties of the stimuli. 
 There are a variety of examples from the empirical literature other than the ones cited by 
Sinnott-Armstrong that could be interpreted as relevant here. For example, consider the startling 
evidence of implicit prejudice or implicit gender biases (see Brauer, Wasel & Niedenthal 2000 
for a review of implicit prejudice; see Banjai and Greenwald 1995 for implicit gender bias). 
People who explicitly reject prejudice are likely to show evidence of implicit racial biases. For 
example, people who explicitly reject prejudice are likely to have different psychophysiological 
responses (e.g. heart rate and skin conductance) to stimuli depicting black people versus those 
depicting white people. While this evidence of implicit prejudice does not show a cognitive bias 
of moral intuitions, it seems reasonable to infer that implicit prejudice does bias moral intuitions; 
that is, it seems reasonable to think that implicit prejudice leads the same person to form 
inconsistent moral intuitions about people from different races performing objectively identical 
actions. The race of the person performing an action is quite clearly a morally irrelevant aspect 
of the situation being judged, but given the evidence of implicit prejudice, this is exactly what we 
should expect. Imagine Jane, who is walking down a city street late at night and notices a man 
approaching her from behind. Upon looking back, it seems that implicit prejudice could result 
Jane being likely to form different moral intuitions about the man depending on his race. We like 
to think that we are unaffected by such implicit biases, but the evidence of implicit prejudice is 
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extensive, and such evidence leads me to accept the fact that our moral intuitions are likely 
affected by many cognitive biases in many circumstances. Thus, I think it is fair to assess the 
argument from cognitive biases on the assumption that premise C4 will be revealed to be true. 
And if it is true, then the intuitionist will need a more nuanced response to Sinnott-Armstrong. 
 
2.4 Rejecting the internalist bias 
 A first attempt to respond to Sinnott-Armstrong might involve rejecting the internalist 
bias in his argument (Shafer-Landau 2008). The argument from cognitive biases assumes that 
under conditions in which a believer has reason to believe that her moral intuitions are 
unreliable, she must confirm those intuitions to be justified. The intuitions might indeed have 
been formed reliably, and reliably track the moral truth; but if one believes that this is not the 
case, then, for Sinnott-Armstrong, an internalist clause must be applied and she must confirm the 
intuition to be justified. The uncompromising externalist can simply reject this internalist clause; 
even when a person has reason to doubt the reliability of her intuitions, if they are, in fact, 
formed reliably, then they are justified—without any need for confirmation. This seems to me to 
be a perfectly sound way to reject the argument from cognitive biases. But it requires that one 
adopt an uncompromising externalist moral epistemology. For those who are externalists of a 
more compromising sort, or who are not externalists at all, rejecting the internalist bias will not 
work. I will attempt to offer a response to the argument from cognitive biases that does not 
require one to adopt any particular moral epistemology. The argument from cognitive biases 
fails, I believe, on a much more fundamental level than its epistemological assumptions—it fails 
even granting Sinnott-Armstrong’s internalist clause. 
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3 The argument from disagreement 
 
 The argument from disagreement is one of the most common arguments against 
intuitionism (Mackie 1977; Loeb 1998; Sinnott-Armstrong 2002, 2006a, 2006b), and in this 
section I will suggest that Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument from cognitive biases is simply a fresh 
take on this old argument (2008a); the argument from cognitive biases attacks intuitionism based 
on inconsistent intuitions within a single subject across different circumstances, while the 
argument from disagreement attacks intuitionism based on inconsistent intuitions between 
different subjects. With this in mind, I will spend some time in this section reviewing the 
argument from disagreement and the intuitionist’s response from the non-moral basis of moral 
disagreement, which I will adapt as a response to the argument from cognitive biases in Section 
4. 
 Recall that the argument from cognitive biases cites the prevalence of cognitive biases, or 
within-subject moral disagreements, to argue that moral intuitions are unreliable, must be 
confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially justified—and thus that moral 
intuitionism is false. Similarly, the argument from disagreement cites the prevalence of moral 
disagreements (or inconsistencies) between-subjects to argue that moral intuitions are unreliable, 
must be confirmed to be justified, and can only be inferentially justified—and thus that 
intuitionism is false (2008a). The only difference between the argument from disagreement and 
the argument from cognitive biases is that the unreliability of moral intuitions is due to moral 
disagreement, rather than cognitive biases. To make clear the parallel with the argument from 
cognitive biases, the argument from disagreement looks like this: 
D1) If moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that 
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, then moral intuitions 
must be confirmed in order to be justified (because without 
confirmation, a believer is not justified in believing her 
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intuitions were formed reliably rather than unreliably, and thus 
she is not justified in believing those intuitions). 
D2) If moral intuitions must be confirmed in order to be justified, 
then they can only be justified inferentially. 
D3) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then 
moral intuitionism is false. 
D4) Moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that 
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.15 
D5) Moral intuitionism is false.16 
 
 Each of these premises was discussed in detail above, in relation to the argument from 
cognitive biases. Again, the only difference is that cognitive biases have now been replaced by 
moral disagreement; within-subject disagreement has been replaced by between-subject 
disagreement. The point of the argument remains the same. Moral intuitions are unreliable 
because of the prevalence of some sort of disagreement, in this case between-subject moral 
disagreement. Thus, intuitions must be confirmed to be justified—and confirmation justifies only 
inferentially. So moral intuitions must be justified inferentially if they are to be justified at all, 
and moral intuitionism is false; moral intuitions cannot be justified non-inferentially. The 
prevalence of moral disagreement is supposed to show that moral intuitionism is false in the 
same way that the prevalence of cognitive biases of moral intuitions was supposed to show that 
intuitionism is false. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 One might argue that moral disagreement, by itself, does not need to be sufficiently prevalent to make moral 
intuitions unreliable, but rather disagreement might be just one of several sources of unreliability that, together, 
make moral intuitions reliable (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a). Thus, it may be that for moral disagreement to present a 
problem for moral intuitionism it need not be so prevalent as to bring moral intuitions’ reliability into question; it 
need only be prevalent enough to do so in combination with other sources of unreliability. I actually think that other 
sources of reliability can be reduced to forms of disagreement, and thus that this way of arguing would reduce to the 
argument from disagreement. 
16 This is my formulation of the argument, which has been reconstructed from Mackie 1977, Sinnott-Armstrong 
2006, and Machery et al. 2005. I have formulated it in this way to make clear the parallel with the argument from 
cognitive biases. 
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3.1 Non-moral basis of moral disagreement 
 
 The intuitionist’s classic response to the argument from disagreement is to argue that 
most moral disputes are not genuine (based solely on disagreement about the moral facts), they 
are derived—they are grounded in disagreement about non-moral facts. David Brink says that 
most “moral disputes are in principle resolvable” because they are grounded in “resolvable 
disagreements over the non-moral facts” (Brink 1984). That is, moral disputes can be resolved 
without moral confirmation; they can be resolved by resolving the non-moral disagreements that 
the moral disputes are based on. In this vein, Richard Boyd suggests, perhaps overly 
optimistically, that “careful examination will reveal…that agreement on nonmoral issues would 
eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of moral issues which arise in ordinary moral 
practice” (1988, p. 123). People disagree about non-moral facts like reincarnation, the ability of 
animals to feel pain, and the long-term consequences of actions—and disagreements in moral 
intuitions often are based on disagreements in such non-moral issues. And this is important 
because moral disagreement grounded in non-moral disagreement would not threaten moral 
intuitionism, since such disagreement could be resolved without making the moral intuitions 
inferable. Once the non-moral disagreement is resolved, the reliability of moral intuitions would 
not be called into question; at least not on the basis of moral disagreement—since there would be 
no moral disagreement once its grounding non-moral disagreement is cleared up. Thus, the moral 
intuitions could (potentially) be justified non-inferentially (so long as there was no other reason 
to question their reliability); the argument from disagreement would not have force against 
intuitionism if moral disagreement is derived. There may be other arguments that do have force, 
but if moral disagreements are derived, and not genuine, then the argument from disagreement 
would not threaten intuitionism. 
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 More specifically, if non-moral disagreements (disagreements about non-moral facts) are 
the basis for most moral disagreements, then premise D1 would be false; the unreliability of 
moral intuitions due to moral disagreement would not show that moral intuitions must be 
confirmed for them to be justified. The unreliability of moral intuitions due to moral 
disagreement which is grounded in non-moral disagreement shows that either people’s moral 
intuitions or their relevant non-moral beliefs must be confirmed to allow their moral intuitions to 
be justified.17 This is because moral disputes based on non-moral disputes can be resolved by 
confirming the moral intuitions—which would justify those moral intuitions inferentially—or the 
non-moral ones—which would not justify the moral intuitions, but would remove the need to 
inferentially justify them that was created by the moral disagreement (since the moral 
disagreement would dissolve once its grounding non-moral disagreement is resolved). 
 As an example, recall the world in which half of the population believes that water 
boarding is morally wrong and half believes it is right. Now imagine that this moral 
disagreement is grounded in a non-moral disagreement, like a disagreement about the average 
effectiveness of water boarding in getting accurate information out of terrorism suspects. 
Suppose that one half of people believe that water boarding is wrong only because it is 
ineffective in getting information, while the other half believes it is right only because it is 
effective in getting information. Now imagine that it is determined that water boarding is, in fact, 
completely ineffective in getting accurate information out of enemies. In this case, everyone in 
the world will agree that water boarding is wrong, since half of the population thought it was 
right only because they (wrongly) believed it to be effective in getting information. The key is 
that since the moral disagreement is grounded in non-moral disagreement, the moral 
disagreement and unreliability of moral intuitions could be resolved by resolving the non-moral 
                                                 
17 The relevant non-moral beliefs are the ones responsible for the moral disagreement. 
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disagreement and unreliability of non-moral beliefs; only the non-moral beliefs (about the 
effectiveness of torture) were confirmed, yet the moral disagreement is resolved. After the non-
moral disagreement was resolved, there remained no moral disagreement that could bring the 
reliability of people’s moral beliefs into question and could demand confirmation of them. Thus, 
while the moral disagreement is sufficiently widespread to bring the reliability of people’s moral 
intuitions about water boarding into doubt, their moral intuitions did not need to be confirmed 
for them to be justified; confirmation of their non-moral beliefs cleared up the moral 
disagreement and, accordingly, cleared up questions of the reliability of their moral intuitions. 
The non-moral confirmation does not itself justify the moral beliefs, but it removes the need for 
inferential justification that was created by the moral disagreement. (There may very well be 
other reasons inferential justification is required, but moral disagreement would not be one of 
them—since no moral disagreement would exist after the non-moral confirmation is provided.) 
Moral confirmation could have been provided to clear up the moral disagreement—if they 
somehow discovered that, in fact, water boarding is wrong—but none was required. Thus, 
premise D1 as stated is false. While, as the antecedent of premise D1 suggests, moral 
disagreement in our imagined world was sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions 
(about water boarding) are, in general, unreliable, contrary to the consequent of premise D1, this 
entailed that either the moral or non-moral beliefs needed confirmation in order for the moral 
intuitions to be justified. 
 To be clear, if most moral disagreement turns out to be derived, or based on non-moral 
disagreement, this would not show that only non-moral beliefs are unreliable instead of moral 
intuitions.18 That is, it would not show that premise D4 and the antecedent of premise D1 are 
                                                 
18 By “most moral disagreements”, I mean that enough moral disagreements are grounded in non-moral 
disagreements so that the reliability of moral intuitions, in general, cannot be called into question by the amount of 
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false. Derived moral disagreement still shows that moral intuitions are unreliable, because the 
same amount of the intuitions are accurate and the same amount remain inaccurate—there is still 
moral disagreement, after all. All it shows is that moral intuitions depend on unreliable non-
moral beliefs for their formation. In this way, derived moral disagreement would suggests that 
premise D1 is false; sufficient disagreement in moral intuitions such that the intuitions are 
unreliable would not entail that the moral intuitions must be confirmed to be justified, but only 
that either the moral intuitions or the non-moral beliefs must be confirmed. 
 It may seem that premise D1 could simply be amended to premise D1`, which states that 
if moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that moral intuitions are, in general, 
unreliable, then moral intuitions or the relevant non-moral beliefs require confirmation in order 
for moral intuitions to be justified. By adopting this move, however, we lose the connection 
between premises D1` and D2; the consequent of premise D1` states that moral intuitions or non-
moral beliefs require confirmation for moral intuitions to be justified, while the antecedent of 
premise D2 refers to only moral intuitions requiring confirmation for them to be justified. And 
premise D2 is false when its connection with premise D1` is restored by amending it to D2`, 
which states that if moral intuitions or non-moral beliefs require confirmation for moral 
intuitions to be justified, then moral intuitions are justified only inferentially. This is because 
non-moral confirmation (i.e. confirmation of one’s non-moral beliefs) does not justify moral 
intuitions inferentially—it does not allow one to infer her moral intuitions from the non-moral 
confirming evidence of her non-moral beliefs.19 As it relates to the example above, people in our 
                                                                                                                                                             
moral disagreement that is not grounded in non-moral disagreement—that is, enough moral disagreements are 
grounded in non-moral disagreements so that the solely moral disagreement that remains is not sufficiently prevalent 
to make premise 4 true. 
19 I may sometimes say that the non-moral confirmation ‘justifies the moral intuitions’—but by this I mean that the 
confirmation removes any reason to question the intuitions reliability, and thus (barring some other reason to reject 
the intuitions), moral intuitions are justified. 
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imagined world cannot infer from the non-moral confirmation of the ineffectiveness of torture to 
the normative claim that torture is wrong, on pain of inferring an ought from an is.20 Still, the 
non-moral confirmation cleared up the source of the unreliability of the moral disagreement, and 
thus allows the moral intuitions to be justified. While the non-moral confirmation does not make 
the intuitions justified, it removes the requirement of moral confirmation for the intuitions’ 
justification—and it does so without making them inferable from the confirming evidence. There 
may be other reasons that moral intuitions are unreliable and require confirmation to be justified, 
but moral disagreement would no longer be one of them if that disagreement is derived. 
 To make D2` true, it would have to read that if moral intuitions or non-moral beliefs must 
be confirmed for moral intuitions to be justified, then, moral intuitions could be justified either 
inferentially or non-inferentially. However, such a conclusion (stated in the consequent), clearly 
poses no threat to intuitionism. Moral intuitionism holds that some moral intuitions can be 
justified non-inferentially, and the conclusion above allows for such non-inferential justification. 
 In this way, the availability of non-moral confirmation as a way of resolving moral 
disagreements would allow the intuitionist to say that moral disagreement does not threaten the 
non-inferential justification of moral intuitions—under conditions in which the non-moral 
disagreement has been resolved, or under ‘ideal conditions’. This is the thesis of what I will call 
a moderate moral intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be non-inferentially 
justified under ideal conditions. So, if most moral disagreements are grounded in non-moral 
disagreements, then the argument from disagreement against a moderate moral intuitionism fails 
because premise D1 is false, and making premise D1 true by amending it to D1` yields a 
conclusion to the argument from disagreement that has no force against intuitionism. Moral 
disagreement may be widespread, but if most of it is grounded in non-moral disagreement then it 
                                                 
20 This is the problem that Hume made famous in A Treatise of Human Nature (Book III, Part I, Section I). 
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does not show that most moral intuitions must be confirmed to be justified, and that intuitionism 
is false. Rather, it would show that either moral intuitions or the relevant non-moral intuitions 
require confirmation, and thus leave the door open for moderate intuitionism (a thesis which I 
think would be perfectly acceptable to most intuitionists, and quite objectionable to their critics, 
like Sinnott-Armstrong). 
 So the unreliability of moral intuitions due to moral disagreement creates the need for 
confirmation of one’s moral intuitions for them to be justified only if the moral disagreement is 
not grounded in non-moral disagreement. That is, premise D1 is true only when the cited moral 
disagreement is genuine—i.e. is not grounded in non-moral disagreement. Thus, for the 
argument from disagreement to go through, it requires an additional premise: 
The relevant moral disagreement is genuine—that is, not grounded 
in non-moral disagreement (disagreement about non-moral facts). 
 
 So we can now formulate a revised argument from disagreement: 
D1*) If moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that 
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, and moral 
disagreement is not grounded in non-moral disagreement, 
then moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be 
justified (because without such confirmation, a believer is 
not justified in believing her intuitions were formed reliably 
rather than unreliably, and thus she is not justified in 
believing those intuitions). 
D2*)  If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be 
justified, then they can only be justified inferentially. 
D3*)  If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then 
moral intuitionism is false. 
D4a*) Moral disagreement is sufficiently prevalent to show that 
moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable.21 
                                                 
21 One might argue that moral disagreement, by itself, does not need to be sufficiently prevalent to make moral 
intuitions unreliable, but rather disagreement might be just one of several sources of unreliability that, together, 
make moral intuitions reliable (Sinnott-Armstrong 2006). Thus, it may be that for moral disagreement to present a 
problem for moral intuitionism it need not be so prevalent as to bring moral intuitions’ reliability into question; it 
need only be prevalent enough to do so in combination with other sources of unreliability. I actually think that other 
sources of reliability can be reduced to forms of disagreement, and thus that this way of arguing would reduce to the 
argument from disagreement. 
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D4b*) The moral disagreement cited in 4a`` is genuine—that is, 
not grounded in non-moral disagreement (disagreement 
about non-moral facts. 
D5*) Moral intuitionism is false. 
 
Note that D4a* is the same as D4, and that D1* is the same as D1, with the addition of D4b* to 
its antecedent. By genuine moral disagreement, I just mean moral disagreement that is not 
grounded in non-moral disagreement (which I will call derived moral disagreement). After the 
argument is properly amended in this way, we see how the intuitionist’s objection from the non-
moral basis of moral disagreement works—by rejecting premise D4b*. For example, David 
Brink argues that “a great many moral disagreements depend upon disagreements over the non-
moral facts”—that is, moral intuitions would converge under ideal conditions, in which the non-
moral facts are agreed upon (1984). In contrast, adherents to the argument from disagreement 
suggest that non-moral disagreement is not sufficient to explain the overwhelming prevalence of 
moral disagreement (Machery, Kelly, and Stich 2005; Doris and Stich 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong 
2006a and 2008a; Brandt 1959). Doris and Stich argue for “pessimistic conclusions regarding the 
possibility of convergence in moral judgment”; few, if any moral intuitions would converge in 
ideal conditions (when non-moral facts are agreed upon), and thus disagreement in moral 
intuitions is not typically grounded in non-moral disagreement. But Loeb conservatively advises 
more serious empirical investigation into whether or not and how many moral disagreements are 
grounded non-moral disagreements before assessing the argument from disagreement and the 
objection from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement (Loeb 1998). These perspectives will 
be important to keep in mind in what follows, as I adapt the intuitionist’s objection from the non-
moral basis of disagreement to object to the argument from cognitive biases on the grounds of 
the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. 
 
40 
4 Non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions 
 
 In what follows, I will attempt to adapt the response from the non-moral basis of moral 
disagreement that the intuitionist offered against the argument from disagreement. This response 
held that most moral disagreements are derived from non-moral disagreements, and thus can be 
resolved by either moral or non-moral confirmation. Since moral intuitions were deemed 
unreliable in premise D4a* because of the prevalence of moral disagreement, once the moral 
disagreement is cleared up by clearing up the non-moral disagreement, there is no reason to think 
that moral intuitions are unreliable. In this way, non-moral confirmation (i.e. confirmation of 
non-moral judgments) can allow moral intuitions to be justified by removing the moral 
disagreement (which was grounded in the non-moral disagreement). It does not make them 
justified, but it rebuts the argument from disagreement because it prevents moral intuitions’ 
reliability from being called into question on the grounds of moral disagreement. And the key is 
that non-moral confirmation does this without making subjects able infer their moral intuitions 
from the confirming evidence that cleared up the moral disagreement, since that confirmation 
was non-moral confirmation of their non-moral judgments, and one cannot infer a moral intuition 
from non-moral evidence. For this reason, the argument from disagreement needed to be 
amended to include the premise that the moral disagreement is genuine—i.e. not grounded in 
non-moral disagreement. The intuitionist then rejects the amended argument from disagreement 
by rejecting this additional premise and holding that most moral disagreement is derived from 
disagreement in non-moral judgments. 
 In Section 4.1 I will reformulate the argument from cognitive biases to include the insight 
that the disagreements (in this case within-subject, cognitive biases) must be genuine. In 4.2 I 
adapt the response from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement to respond to the argument 
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from cognitive biases, arguing for the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. Then in Section 4.3 I 
will discuss some replies to this objection suggested by Sinnott-Armstrong. In the end, I believe 
that more and better designed experiments can resolve this dispute, and in Section 5 I will 
present an initial experiment I have conducted in collaboration with Eddy Nahmias that weighs 
in favor of the intuitionist’s response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. 
 
4.1 Revised argument from cognitive biases 
 Recall that the only difference between the argument from cognitive biases and the 
argument from disagreement is that the unreliability of moral intuitions is due to cognitive 
biases, rather than moral disagreement. So we should expect unreliability due to cognitive biases 
to have the same limitation as unreliability due to moral disagreement; namely, that if cognitive 
biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral judgments (i.e. if the cognitive 
biases of moral intuitions are derived), then those biases would not threaten intuitionism since 
they can be resolved by non-moral confirmation. Thus, we can formulate a revised argument 
from cognitive biases: 
C1*) If moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive 
biases to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable, 
and those cognitive biases are not grounded in biases of non-
moral beliefs, then moral intuitions must be confirmed in 
order to be justified (because without confirmation, a believer 
is not justified in believing her intuitions were formed reliably 
rather than unreliably, and thus she is not justified in believing 
those intuitions) 
C2*) If moral intuitions require confirmation in order to be 
justified, then they can only be justified inferentially. 
C3*) If moral intuitions can only be justified inferentially, then 
moral intuitionism is false. 
C4a*) Moral intuitions are sufficiently affected by cognitive biases 
to show that moral intuitions are, in general, unreliable. 
C4b*) The cognitive biases cited in C4a are genuine—that is, not 
grounded in biases of non-moral judgments (biases of people’s 
beliefs or intuitions about non-moral facts). 
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C5*) Moral intuitionism is false 
 
 This revised argument has added premise C4b*, which holds that the cognitive biases 
cited in the argument must not be grounded in biases of non-moral judgments, and has also 
added that proposition to the antecedent of C1. The reason is the same as it was for adding 
premise D4b* to the revised argument from disagreement. Moral inconsistency is what brings 
the reliability of moral intuitions into question in the first place, and what accordingly drives the 
arguments against intuitionism from disagreement and cognitive biases. If the inconsistencies in 
moral intuitions cited in these arguments are grounded in inconsistencies in non-moral beliefs or 
intuitions, then clearing up the non-moral difference would dissolve the moral inconsistency. 
And the key is that it would dissolve the moral inconsistency without providing inferential 
justification of the moral intuitions (since one could not infer her moral intuitions from the non-
moral confirmation; see Section 3.1 for more on this). 
 
4.2 Non-moral basis of biases 
 
 Recall that the argument from disagreement is based on between-subject differences in 
moral intuitions, while the argument from cognitive biases is based on within-subject differences 
in moral intuitions (e.g. the same subject would have different intuitions about different 
presentations of objectively equivalent moral dilemmas or scenarios). The objection from the 
non-moral basis of moral disagreement rejects premise D4b* in the argument from disagreement 
by holding that much moral disagreement is derived, or based on non-moral disagreement; that 
is, many differences in moral intuitions between-subjects are grounded in differences non-moral 
judgments between-subjects. Analogously, this response can be adapted to respond to the 
argument from cognitive biases by rejecting premise C4b*, and holding that the cognitive biases 
of moral intuitions are derived; that is, many differences in a single subject’s moral intuitions 
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(about objectively equivalent dilemmas presented in different ways) are grounded in differences 
in that subject’s non-moral judgments22 (about the objectively equivalent dilemmas presented in 
different ways). This response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases suggests that a given 
subject makes different non-moral judgments about a scenario when the scenario is framed in 
different ways, and it is largely on the basis of this difference in non-moral judgments that the 
subject forms different moral intuitions about the scenario framed in different ways. 
Accordingly, I contend that many of the cognitive biases of subjects’ moral intuitions are 
grounded in biases of their non-moral judgments in this way. By “many”, I mean that enough 
cognitive biases of moral intuitions are derived (i.e. grounded in non-moral biases) such that any 
remaining genuine biases of moral intuitions are not sufficient to call into question the reliability 
of the class of moral intuitions under ideal conditions, or when non-moral biases are not present.  
 As an example, consider how non-moral biases might ground the moral biases found in 
Petrinovich and O’Neill’s trolley dilemma. Subjects were more likely to say that flipping the 
switch is appropriate in the Save wording than in the Kill wording. The response from the non-
moral basis of cognitive biases suggests that a significant part of the reason that subjects respond 
differently to the Kill and Save wordings is because they make different non-moral judgments 
about the scenario depending on the wording used. When framed in terms of the people that will 
be killed, a subject’s options are: 
“Throw the switch which will result in the death of the one 
innocent person on the side track.” (Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996) 
 One possibility is that when presented with this Kill wording, the emphasis in that 
wording on the killing of the one person on the side track makes it likely that subjects will form 
the non-moral judgment that throwing the switch will be very likely to kill the one person, but 
                                                 
22 Recall that these differences in non-moral judgments are not necessarily consciously formed–they may be 
subconscious and may be easily changed. For example, they might fluctuate when the context changes, when new 
information becomes available, or even when the subject’s attention focuses on new aspects of the scenario. 
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might fail to save the five people on the main track (i.e. will be a futile attempt to save the five 
people). This is because the Kill wording explicitly highlights the fact that the one will be killed, 
but does not mention what will happen to the five. And if throwing the switch, killing one 
person, is not going to save the five people, then it makes perfect sense not to throw the switch. 
Similarly, subjects may be less likely to make these judgments when presented with the Save 
wording: 
“Throw the switch, which will result in the five innocent people on 
the main track being saved.” (Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996) 
 When subjects read this Save wording, they may be more likely to make the non-moral 
judgment that flipping the switch will, in fact, save the five people on the main track (after all, 
that is exactly what it says). Such a non-moral judgment might at least partially explain why 
subjects who read the Save wording were more likely to endorse flipping the switch—because 
they were more likely to judge that flipping the switch would save the five people. Furthermore, 
the Save wording may have made it less likely that subjects would believe that flipping the 
switch would kill the one person (after all, the question asking if it is appropriate to flip the 
switch says that the five will be saved, but makes no mention of the one person being killed); in 
contrast, the Kill wording might have the opposite effect, making it more likely that subjects 
would believe that flipping the switch would kill the one person (after all, the question says that 
the one will be killed, but makes no mention of the five being saved). 
 Also, Petrinovich and O’Neil reported that subjects were more likely to disagree with not 
flipping the switch in Kill than in Save. This again may be explained by the fact that not flipping 
the switch is described as resulting in the five people on the main track dying in Kill, while 
resulting in the one person on the side track being saved in Save. The non-moral facts are the 
same in both Kill and Save—if the switch is not flipped, the one person on the side track will live 
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in Kill, and the five people on the main track will die in Save. But these different frames 
highlight different non-moral facts of the dilemma, and thus are likely to result in subjects 
making different non-moral judgments about the dilemma in the two different presentations (Kill 
versus Save). And the key is that their different non-moral judgments may explain why they 
formed different moral intuitions. They saw the non-moral facts of the case differently in the two 
conditions, and moral intuitions are formed based on the non-moral facts as one sees them. 
 Or perhaps, more simply, non-moral judgments may be biased because subjects’ attention 
in Save is subconsciously focused on the fact that flipping the switch would save five people. 
They may not even be aware they that are paying more attention to certain facts of the case. But 
nonetheless, their non-moral judgments about the case may be subconsciously influenced by 
their attention being focused on saving the five people rather than killing the one person—and 
the differences in their moral intuitions could be explained by this difference in non-moral 
intuitions. It is true that if asked about whether the trolley would kill the one person, they could 
probably easily report that it would, because the question would refocus their attention from the 
fact that flipping the switch would save the five people to a different aspect of the case (viz. 
whether or not flipping the switch would kill the one person). And when attending to this other 
fact people will probably be able to report it accurately. But it is subjects’ non-moral judgments 
about the non-moral facts of the case when they form their moral intuition that are relevant—and 
the different frames likely modify their non-moral judgments about the facts of the case 
(subconsciously, and perhaps only for a short time) by focusing their attention on certain facts of 
the case rather than others. 
 We should note that subjects are supposed to base their responses on exactly what the 
scenario says. Since it says in the Save scenario (even if not in the description of the options) that 
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flipping the switch will result in the death of the one person on the side track, then that fact 
should be what subjects base their judgments on. But what is important in determining the basis 
of the cognitive biases effects on moral intuitions is not what subjects are supposed to base their 
responses on, but what they, in fact, do base their responses on. Thus, again, what is relevant is 
the non-moral judgments that subjects actually have in mind when they offer their moral 
judgments. And it is likely that those judgments are not true to the facts of the scenario, but are 
affected by the way the scenario is presented.  
 The main problem with the response to the argument from disagreement from the non-
moral basis of disagreement is that it suggests that most moral beliefs are virtually universally 
agreed upon, and that for most moral disagreements people actually agree about the moral 
principles and what is morally at stake, they just disagree about the facts of the case at hand. This 
seems like a rather unlikely consequence of the response from the non-moral basis of 
disagreement; it seems reasonable (to many philosophers, myself included) that many moral 
disagreements are genuine moral disagreements, rather than mere derived moral disagreements 
actually based on disagreement about the non-moral facts of the case (Machery et al. 2005; Doris 
and Stich 2005; Sinnott-Armstrong 2006a and 2008a; Brandt 1959) 
 The response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases does not seem as susceptible 
to an analogous problem. It seems very likely that part of ordinary moral psychology is a form of 
moral supervenience, where moral facts are taken to supervene on non-moral facts. That is, it 
seems likely that most people hold that if two cases do not differ in their non-moral properties, 
then they do not differ in their moral properties. Surely most people subscribe to such a thesis.23 
Surely people are surprised to find out about the cognitive biases of moral intuitions discussed 
above; if the dilemmas are objectively equivalent, obviously they should be judged the same. 
                                                 
23 This statement is ripe for experimental investigation. 
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Such supervenience seems as obvious to me as the wrongness of killing children for fun. At the 
very least, it seems far more likely that people do ascribe to the thesis of moral supervenience 
than reject it. And if one agrees that people probably ascribe to moral supervenience, then it 
seems strained to think that within-subject differences in moral intuitions are grounded in 
anything other than within-subject differences in non-moral judgments; since people subscribe to 
the thesis of moral supervenience, the same person should have different moral intuitions about 
the same scenario only if she made different non-moral judgments about that scenario. 
Admittedly, this is a statement about how people’s intuitions should behave—but by should here, 
I mean not only that rationality demands intuitions to behave in this way, but also that we should 
expect that, upon empirical investigation, people’s intuitions actually do behave in this way. If 
most people do ascribe to the thesis of moral supervenience, then we should expect that 
empirical probing will show that cognitive biases of moral intuitions occur only (or mostly) 
when biases of non-moral judgments also occur. 
 Once it is established that many cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in 
biases of non-moral intuitions, the response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases follows 
the same route at the response from the non-moral basis of moral disagreement. Since cognitive 
biases of moral intuitions are due to biases of non-moral intuitions, they can be resolved by 
either moral or non-moral confirmation. Thus, premise C1 is false because the unreliability of 
moral intuitions does not imply that moral confirmation is required for a moral intuition to be 
justified—only that either moral or non-moral confirmation is required. The non-moral 
confirmation would not itself justify the moral intuitions, but it would remove the cognitive 
biases and unreliability of moral intuitions since those biases were based on biases and 
unreliability of non-moral judgments, and the non-moral judgments are not unreliable once they 
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are confirmed. In this way, non-moral confirmation of non-moral beliefs allows moral intuitions 
to be justified, and it does so without making people able to infer their moral intuitions from the 
non-moral confirmation (again, refer to Section 3.1 for more on why this is so). 
 
4.3 An initial objection and a response 
 
 Before moving on to more empirical discussions, consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s initial 
response to the idea that within-subject differences in moral intuitions are grounded in non-moral 
differences. He says that the “changes in [a subject’s] moral belief [described in the research on 
framing effects] cannot be due to changes in the facts of the case, because consequences, 
knowledge, intention, and other facts are held constant” (2008a, 67). Sinnott-Armstrong is 
almost anticipating the response from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases; however, it is not 
non-moral differences in the stimuli that are relevant (since, as he notes, there are not any 
relevant non-moral differences in the stimuli). Rather, it is differences in subjects’ non-moral 
judgments about the stimuli that are relevant. 
 Sinnott-Armstrong does, however, anticipate a sort of objection from the non-moral basis 
of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, but it seems that he fails to appreciate its force. He says 
that in the relevant empirical studies, the “descriptions of the cases were admittedly incomplete, 
so subjects might have filled in gaps in different ways” (2008a, 67). That is, the biases of moral 
intuitions might be due to the fact that subjects fill in the unspecified non-moral facts of the case 
in different ways. But he responds to this point by saying that “moral intuitions would still be 
unreliable. Wording and context would still lead to conflict moral judgments about a single 
description of a scenario” (2008a, 69). Since they are unreliable, Sinnott-Armstrong argues, they 
still demand confirmation to be confirmed. 
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 However, he fails to note that the confirmation the unreliable moral intuitions would 
demand can be non-moral confirmation of the non-moral judgments—which would remove the 
biases of moral intuitions without making the intuitions inferable from the confirmation. This is 
why I have gone out of my way to show the parallels between the argument from cognitive 
biases and the argument from moral disagreement; because it is widely agreed that if moral 
disagreement is based on non-moral disagreement, then the argument from moral disagreement 
would have no force against the intuitionist. According to Sinnott-Armstrong himself, “when 
disagreements about moral issues arise solely from non-moral disagreements and conceptual 
confusions that could be removed by further inquiry and reflection, informed and rational people 
would not disagree” (2002). Such derived moral disagreements do not present a serious threat to 
intuitionism because all the intuitionist needs to claim is that moral intuitions can be non-
inferentially justified once the non-moral disagreement is cleared up. And the argument from 
cognitive biases is just the argument from disagreement redone, with the between-subject 
disagreement being replaced with within-subject disagreement. Thus, we should expect that it 
faces a similar restriction; if cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-
moral intuitions, then the argument from cognitive biases does not threaten (a moderate form of) 
moral intuitionism. And I have argued that it fails to meet this restriction. Cognitive biases of 
moral intuitions are likely grounded in biases of non-moral intuitions. 
 At the very least, it should be clear by now that the response from the non-moral basis of 
cognitive biases cannot be easily dismissed. What is needed to evaluate the response is an 
empirical exploration of people’s moral intuitions and how they are related to their non-moral 
intuitions—are biases of moral intuitions based on biases of non-moral intuitions? In this vein, in 
Section 5 I will discuss an initial study that Eddy Nahmias and I conducted which suggests that 
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people’s non-moral intuitions about the believability of certain outcomes stipulated in a moral 
dilemma have a significant influence on their moral intuitions about the dilemma. 
 
5 Empirical support for the intuitionist’s reply 
 
 The studies cited in Sections 2.3.1 through 2.3.4 fail to determine whether or not the 
cognitive biases of moral intuitions that they reveal are genuine or derived from biases of non-
moral intuitions. To initially examine this point, I conducted a survey study in collaboration with 
Eddy Nahmias in which we probed people’s moral intuitions about a novel battery of moral 
dilemmas, and also examined their non-moral judgments about the dilemmas. There were two 
primary questions this study was designed to answer: (i) is there a self-other bias in moral 
intuitions about personal moral dilemmas? And (ii) are differences in people’s moral intuitions 
correlated with differences in their non-moral judgments about a dilemma. While Nadelhoffer 
and Feltz found a self-other bias using impersonal dilemmas, we found no self-other bias using 
personal dilemmas, suggesting that the self-other biasing of moral intuitions should be further 
probed to determine the reliability of these findings and the nature of the self-other bias of moral 
intuitions before this bias is used to argue against intuitionism. Also, we found that non-moral 
judgments predict subjects’ moral intuitions across a variety of moral dilemmas, which suggests 
that differences in moral intuitions about moral dilemmas might be grounded in biases of 
subjects’ non-moral judgments—differences in subjects’ moral intuitions about different, but 
objectively equivalent presentations of a moral dilemma might be due to differences in their non-
moral judgments about the different presentations of the dilemma. Much more work will need to 
be done to continue to evaluate this claim. 
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5.1 Methods 
 
 Two different surveys, Survey 1 (N=210) and Survey 2 (N=187), each consisting of 8 
different personal moral dilemmas24 (making a total of 16 different dilemmas),25 were presented 
to Georgia State undergraduates enrolled in psychology and philosophy courses using Question 
Pro (an online survey program). Here is one of the dilemmas, nicknamed Underwater Hatch:26 
You are the director of an underwater research facility. There has 
been an explosion and water is pouring into the facility, causing all 
of the doors to begin closing automatically. You and six other 
researchers are in a room that is being sealed off by a closing door. 
At the last minute, someone in the hall tries to make it to safety in 
the room by sliding under the closing door, but he is too late and 
the door closes on his arm, trapping him outside and making it 
impossible for him to get into the room. This also prevents the 
door from closing and allows water to rush into the room. 
If nothing is done, the water will flood the room and drown you 
and everyone else inside, including the person trapped under the 
door. The only way to save you and the other researchers is for you 
(the facility director) to cut the trapped person’s arm off with an 
axe, leaving him out in the hallway where he will drown, allowing 
the door to close and preventing the room from flooding. 
After reading the dilemma, subjects were asked the moral question: 
 
M) How appropriate is it for you to chop the trapped person’s arm 
off, leaving him out in the hallway where he will drown in order to 
save yourself and the six other researchers in the room? 
They rated the appropriateness of the action on a 6-point Likert scale with no zero, with -3 being 
completely inappropriate and +3 being completely appropriate. 
                                                 
24 I follow Green et. al (2001) in defining a personal moral dilemma as a dilemma in which the action in question 
“(a) could reasonably be expected to lead to serious bodily harm (b) to a particular person or a member or members 
of a particular group of people (c) where this harm is not the result of deflecting an existing threat onto a different 
party.” 
25 See Appendix A for the full text of all of the dilemmas. You will notice that the dilemmas were constructed to 
vary on a variety of dimensions within the context of a personal moral dilemma. For example, some involve 
personally killing a family member, killing in various ways (drowning, shooting, etc.).  which will not be separately 
analyzed here. These will be ignored for the purposes of this paper, but will present an interesting area for deeper 
exploration of the data. 
26 None of the surveys that subjects completed included the dilemmas’ nicknames or the question labels (e.g. M or 
L1). 
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 To probe their non-moral judgments about the scenario, subjects were then asked two 
“likeliness” questions. They rated how likely they thought two stipulated outcomes of the 
scenario were on a 5-point scale, with zero being “not likely at all” and 4 being “definitely will 
happen”. The judgments subjects express in response to these questions are judgments about 
probabilities of potential consequences of performing, or not performing, the action described in 
the scenario, and thus they are judgments about the non-moral facts of the case. The first 
likeliness question asked what subjects thought about the outcome of not performing the 
proposed action as stipulated in the scenario: 
L1) If you do NOT chop the trapped person’s arm off, how likely 
do you think it is that the room will flood and you, the six other 
researchers in the room, and the trapped person will drown? 
The consequent here is what the scenario says will happen if “you do not chop the trapped 
person’s arm off”; so the question is asking how much you believe what the scenario says will 
happen. The second likeliness question asked what subjects thought about the stipulated outcome 
of performing the action: 
L2) If you DO chop the trapped person’s arm off, how likely do 
you think it is that the door will seal and you and the six other 
researchers in the room will be safe, while the trapped person will 
drown outside?  
Again, subjects are being asked how much they believe what the scenario says will happen. 
 Lastly, subjects were asked a Yes/No comprehension question, to detect if they were 
paying attention to relevant details of the scenario: 
In this scenario, is the research facility flooding with water? 
 To look for a self-other bias within these personal dilemmas, each of the two surveys, 1 
and 2, presented subjects with 4 dilemmas in the Self condition (where the subject was the 
proposed actor, as in Underwater Hatch above) and 4 dilemmas in the Other condition (where 
another person, e.g. “John”, was the proposed actor). And there were two versions of each 
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survey, such that the two versions had opposite dilemmas in the Self and Other conditions. So for 
Survey 1, version A, 4 dilemmas were in the Self condition, and 4 in the Other condition—and 
for Survey 1, version B, those same dilemmas were placed in the opposite condition (and 
similarly for the 8 dilemmas of Survey 2). Thus, each of the 16 dilemmas was in the Self 
condition in one version of a survey, and in the Other condition in another version of that survey. 
 To control for order effects, each survey version (A and B) consisted of two blocks (X 
and Y) of 4 dilemmas. The blocks consisted of 2 Self and 2 Other dilemmas quasi-randomized to 
alternate between Self and Other dilemmas. Within a given survey version, one block began with 
a Self dilemma, while the other block began with an Other dilemma. So, consider Survey 1, 
version A. Half of subjects saw the following order of dilemmas, the other half reversed the two 
blocks: Block X (Dilemma 1 [Self], Dilemma 2 [Other], Dilemma 3 [Self], Dilemma 4 [ Other]), 
Block Y (Dilemma 5 [Other], Dilemma 6 [Self], Dilemma 7 [Other], Dilemma 8 [Self]). Survey 
1, version B presented the exact same dilemmas in the same orders, except that each dilemma 
was flipped between the Self and Other conditions. Survey 2 (versions A and B) followed the 
same pattern, except with Dilemmas 9-16. 
 
5.2 Results and analyses 
 
 Subjects who missed more than two of the eight comprehension questions on their survey 
were excluded from the analyses (Survey 1, 24 excluded; Survey 2, 19 excluded). Also, subjects 
who took more than 60 minutes or less than 5 minutes were excluded, because it is likely that 
they were not taking the survey all at once, or were moving through the survey without actively 
participating (an additional 8 from Survey 1, and 5 from Survey 2). So for the analyses, there 
were 168 subjects in Survey 1 and 161 subjects in Survey 2. 
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 To determine if there was an effect of the Self versus Other conditions on moral 
responses (to question M), independent samples t-tests (two-tailed) were performed on each of 
the dilemmas, comparing moral judgments across conditions. There were no significant 
differences in moral responses between the Self and Other conditions for any of the 16 moral 
dilemmas. 
 To determine if subjects’ non-moral judgments predict their moral intuitions, three 
separate multiple regression analyses were performed on each dilemma (the data is presented in 
Appendix A). The following background factors were controlled for in all of the regression 
analyses (and were entered in the regression equations in this order): gender, whether the 
subjects have completed a philosophy course, the course they were participating in the survey for 
(Philosophy or Psychology), the dilemma version (Self or Other), and dilemma order. For all of 
the dilemmas, L1 was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of moral responses when these factors 
were controlled for, in addition to the predictive effects of L2 being controlled for. For 10 of the 
16 dilemmas, L2 was a significant predictor (p < 0.05) of moral responses when the background 
factors were controlled for, in addition to the predictive effects of E2 being controlled for. L2 
was a significant predictor (p < 0.10) for 4 of the dilemmas, and non-significant for 2 dilemmas 
(Secret Agent and Remote Waterfall). Also, for all of the 16 dilemmas, a composite likeliness 
rating (the sum of a subject’s responses to L1 and L2) was a significant predictor (p < 0.001) of 
moral responses when the background factors were controlled. 
 
5.3 Discussion 
 There was no significant difference between subjects’ moral judgments in the Self and 
Other conditions. The present study did not go far enough to ensure that the moral judgments 
subjects made were representative of subjects’ moral intuitions, rather than moral beliefs that 
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they formed inferentially or that they would easily give up; this is something that researchers of 
moral psychology should focus on in future studies. However, on the assumption that the 
judgments do indicate intuitions (an assumption proponents of the argument from cognitive 
biases would endorse), we can say that there was no significant difference between subjects’ 
moral intuitions in the Self and Other conditions. That is, the present study suggests that there is 
not a self-other cognitive bias in moral intuitions about personal moral dilemmas. Further 
investigation will be required to determine if there is a self-other bias of moral intuitions at all, 
and if so whether it is restricted to a bias of intuitions about impersonal dilemmas. Thus, contrary 
to Nadelhoffer and Feltz, it is not clear that the self-other bias can offer much support for 
premise C4a* of the argument from cognitive biases, which holds that moral intuitions are 
sufficiently subject to cognitive biases to show that they are unreliable. If intuitions about 
impersonal dilemmas are, in fact, subject to a self-other bias, while intuitions about personal 
dilemmas are not, this would still create a lot of biased moral intuitions in the ‘moral intuition’ 
class of moral beliefs. But given the early nature of the evidence, the fact that impersonal 
dilemmas have been shown to be affected by a self-other bias, while personal dilemmas have 
not, suggests that further investigation is needed to assess whether or not, and to what extent 
moral intuitions are affected by a self-other bias. 
 Nonetheless, as discussed in Section 2.3, there remain a variety of other cognitive biases 
of moral intuitions about other dilemmas that are quite well established, and that can be used to 
support C4a*. So I take it that the more important aspect of the present study is the high degree 
of correlation between subjects’ moral intuitions and their non-moral judgments; non-moral 
judgments were highly significant predictors of moral intuitions for each of the 16 dilemmas. 
This finding is not interesting simply because it shows a link between subjects’ moral intuitions 
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and non-moral judgments. Obviously the non-moral judgments we make about a case affect our 
moral intuitions. When we judge someone to be shooting a gun in target practice, we do not 
intuit it to be wrong, but when we judge someone to be shooting a gun at an innocent child, we 
do intuit it to be wrong. Our different judgments of the non-moral facts about what the gun is 
being shot at helps explain why we form different moral intuitions. 
 What is interesting here is instead that subjects’ non-moral judgments about how 
believable they found the scenarios predict their moral intuitions. It seems that subjects’ moral 
intuitions about the 16 moral dilemmas examined in the present study were not formed simply 
based on the stipulated facts of the dilemmas—that is, on the stipulated likeliness of the 
outcomes of performing or not performing the proposed actions (outcomes which were always 
said to be what will happen). Rather, their moral intuitions were formed using their own 
judgments about the likeliness of the outcomes, which differed across the scenarios. Thus, it is 
likely that when responding to a moral dilemma like the ones taken to show biasing of moral 
intuitions (from Section 2.3), subjects do not respond based on the stipulated facts of the case, 
like the stipulated likeliness of the outcomes of the potential courses of action (e.g. “You can 
throw the switch, saving the five innocent people, which will result in the death of the one 
innocent person on the side track”; Petrinovich and O’Neil 1996). Rather, they respond based on 
what they judge the likeliness of the outcomes to be, even when the scenario specifies what the 
outcome will be. For example, in Underwater Hatch, when a subject judged that it is ‘not at all 
likely’ that not chopping off the person’s arm will result in the room from flooding, she was 
likely to judge that chopping off the person’s arm is wrong. It is clearly wrong to chop off the 
person’s arm if that action is not necessary to prevent the room from flooding (i.e. if the room 
will not flood—or if you do not think it is likely to flood—if you do not chop off his arm). The 
57 
scenario stipulated that if you do not chop off his arm, then the room will flood; but subjects 
varied in how probable they thought this stipulation was, and those who thought it was less 
probable were more likely to judge chopping off the arm as wrong. 
 The ability to use non-moral judgments to predict moral intuitions supports the 
intuitionist’s objection from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases of moral intuitions, which 
rejects premise C4b* by arguing that cognitive biases of moral intuitions are grounded in biases 
of non-moral intuitions. People’s non-moral judgments about the believability of moral 
dilemmas predicts their moral responses—so it is possible that some of the cognitive biases of 
moral intuitions used to support premise C4a* (discussed in section 2.3) are grounded in biasing 
effects on subjects’ non-moral judgments, such as biases of judgments about the likeliness of the 
stipulated outcomes of the dilemmas. 
 This is just one sort of non-moral judgment that might be affected by a cognitive bias, 
leading to the biasing of moral intuitions. But there are many other non-moral judgments that 
might be biased in the relevant dilemmas—like subjects’ beliefs about the facts of the case that 
are not described in the short presentation of the dilemma (like the character traits of the other 
people described in the dilemma, their health, the likely future consequences of the actions, and 
so on). For example, Kuhn showed that people’s non-moral judgments about the probability of 
certain events—probabilities which were unspecified in the descriptions of the scenarios—are 
affected by framing effects (1997). 
 Admittedly, the present study has demonstrated only a correlation between moral 
intuitions and non-moral judgments—so it does not directly support the intuitionist’s objection 
from the non-moral basis of cognitive biases. This objection requires that the differences in a 
person’s moral intuitions are caused by the differences in her non-moral judgments. But the 
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correlation between moral and non-moral judgments could be explained by saying that the 
differences in non-moral judgments are caused by differences in moral intuitions. For example, 
moral and non-moral judgments might be correlated because subjects adjust their non-moral 
judgments in a way to rationalize their moral intuitions. In the Underwater Hatch dilemma, a 
subject might say that chopping off the trapped person’s arm is wrong, and then rationalize that 
judgment by saying that it is ‘not at all likely’ that (i) the room will flood if she does not chop off 
his arm, and that (ii) the room will not flood if she does chop off his arm. That is, after saying it 
is wrong to chop off the person’s arm, she might rationalize that judgment by saying that not 
chopping of the person’s arm wont result in the room flooding, and that chopping the person’s 
arm off wont prevent the room from flooding—making it obviously wrong to chop off the 
person’s arm, since doing so has no beneficial consequences. She rationalizes her judgment by 
thinking that the room will flood or not flood regardless of whether or not she chops off the 
person’s arm. 
 However, I think there is good reason to think that the causal arrow goes the other way, 
with the differences in non-moral judgments causing the differences in moral intuitions. As 
discussed in Section 4.2, it seems likely that part of ordinary moral psychology is the thesis of 
moral supervenience, which holds that if two cases do not differ in their non-moral properties, 
then they do not differ in their non-moral properties. And this would suggest that within-subject 
differences in moral intuitions (which would include cognitive biases of intuitions) should be 
grounded in within-subject differences in non-moral judgments; given the thesis of moral 
supervenience, a given subject would not have different moral intuitions about two cases unless 
she made different non-moral judgments about them. Thus, the fact that subjects’ non-moral, 
epistemic judgments are significant predictors of their moral intuitions provides is best explained 
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by the non-moral judgments playing a causal role in the formation of subjects’ moral intuitions. 
This makes it seem very likely that many cognitive biases of subjects’ moral intuitions are 
grounded in biases of their non-moral intuitions; that is, premise C4b* of the argument from 
cognitive biases is plausibly false, and the argument fails to go through. 
 There are a variety of limitations to the present study that should make us cautious in 
interpreting the results. Most importantly, the claim that ordinary moral psychology includes the 
thesis of moral supervenience is an empirical claim that to my knowledge has not been 
evaluated. It seems likely to be vindicated, but without such vindication at present my claim that 
the differences in non-moral, epistemic judgments causally contribute to differences in moral 
intuitions is largely speculative and should be understood as such. Also, as already mentioned, 
this research has failed to address the difference between moral beliefs and moral intuitions; the 
moral judgments subjects make might represent moral intuitions (qua strongly held, non-
inferentially formed moral beliefs), or they might represent mere moral beliefs that subjects 
would easily give up. 
 
6 Conclusions 
 
 To conclude, I have attempted to show the parallel between Sinnott-Armstrong’s recent 
argument from cognitive biases and the well-known argument from disagreement. Because of 
this tight parallel, the argument from cognitive biases is subject to an objection that is often 
levied against the argument from disagreement; many of the cognitive biases cited to show that 
moral intuitions are unreliable are not genuine, they are derived. That is, the cognitive biases of 
moral intuitions are grounded in biases of non-moral intuitions. And derived biases of moral 
intuitions, like derived moral disagreements, can be resolved by resolving the relevant non-moral 
biases, which would remove the unreliability of moral intuitions without making them inferable. 
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Since that unreliability was the reason moral intuitions required inferential justification in the 
first place, when it is removed without making moral intuitions inferable, those intuitions can be 
justified non-inferentially. Thus, derived cognitive biases would not threaten a moderate moral 
intuitionism, which holds that moral intuitions can be justified under ideal conditions. There may 
be reasons why moral intuitions cannot be justified, inferentially or non-inferentially, but 
cognitive biases are not among of them, contrary to the claims of proponents of the argument 
from cognitive biases (Sinnott-Armstrong 2008a, 2008b; Nadelhoffer and Feltz in prep.; 
Vayrynen forthcoming). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Regression Statistics 
 
The dependent variable was subjects’ moral responses. You can read the text of the scenarios in 
Appendix B. The following were controlled for (and were entered in the regression equation in 
this order): gender, whether the subjects have completed a philosophy course, the course they 
were participating in the survey for (Philosophy or Psychology), the dilemma version (Self or 
Other), and dilemma order. After these factors were partialed out, the predictor variable was 
entered, and the data below represents the change in the regression model’s ability to predict the 
dependent variable when the predictor was added. E1 is the first non-moral question (asking “If 
you do NOT X, how likely is it that Y?”). E2 is the second non-moral questions (asking “If you 
DO X, how likely is it that Y?”). E Composite is the sum of a subject’s responses to E1 and E2, 
and represents an overall non-moral judgment of the believability of the scenario; that is, a non-
moral judgment about the believability of the outcomes that are stipulated in the scenario. 
*significant at p = 0.05  **significant at p = 0.01  ***significant at p = 0.001 
Dilemma Predictor ΔR2 F ratio 
(for ΔR2) 
p value 
Secret Agent E1 0.036 7.167 0.008** 
 E2 0.005 0.961 0.328 
 E Composite 0.42 8.391 0.004** 
Underwater Hatch E1 0.149 34.836 0.000***
 E2 0.015 3.582 0.060 
 E Composite .0201 45.378 0.000***
Remote Waterfall E1 0.175 42.985 0.000***
 E2 0.010 2.412 0.122 
 E Composite 0.194 45.599 0.000***
Hospital Worker E1 0.164 36.557 0.000***
 E2 0.015 3.432 0.066 
 E Composite 0.155 33.240 0.000***
Sniper E1 0.102 23.206 0.000***
 E2 0.038 8.630 0.004** 
 E Composite 0.177 40.053 0.000***
Antidote E1 0.065 13.999 0.000***
 E2 0.018 3.919 0.049* 
 E Composite 0.108 23.320 0.000***
Space Shuttle E1 0.107 25.101 0.000***
 E2 0.023 5.297 0.023* 
 E Composite 0.182 42.146 0.000***
Desert Burial E1 0.144 32.998 0.000***
 E2 0.014 3.296 0.071 
 E Composite 0.156 34.497 0.000***
Bunker E1 0.111 22.095 0.000***
 E2 0.045 9.082 0.003** 
 E Composite 0.133 26.451 0.000***
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Hot Air Balloon E1 0.120 29.690 0.000***
 E2 0.044 10.979 0.001** 
 E Composite 0.233 57.643 0.000***
Firefighter Bucket E1 0.066 12.062 0.001***
 E2 0.019 3.393 0.067 
 E Composite 0.101 18.370 0.000***
Agonizing Choice E1 0.067 13.039 0.000***
 E2 0.086 16.872 0.000***
 E Composite 0.156 30.750 0.000***
Seaside Cave E1 0.140 30.769 0.000***
 E2 0.021 4.593 0.034* 
 E Composite 0.154 32.520 0.000***
Crying Baby E1 0.090 17.920 0.000***
 E2 0.068 13.619 0.000***
 E Composite 0.170 34.114 0.000***
Mountain Climbing E1 0.106 21.299 0.000***
 E2 0.030 5.974 0.016* 
 E Composite 0.156 31.291 0.000***
Mine E1 0.043 7.866 0.006** 
 E2 0.022 4.113 0.044* 
 E Composite 0.112 20.766 0.000***
 
 
Appendix B: Moral Dilemmas 
 
Survey 1 
 
Secret agent (Self version) 
 
 You are a government agent who has been captured by the enemy. They want you to give 
them the code to access information on the location of a bomb. If you do give them the code, the 
enemy will gain access to a bomb which they will use to blow up a government building, 
resulting in hundreds of deaths. 
 If you do not give them the code, they will torture an unknown four-year-old child to 
death right before your eyes. 
 
Underwater Hatch (Other version) 
 
 You work in an underwater research facility. There has been an explosion and water is 
pouring into the facility, causing all of the doors to begin closing automatically. You, the facility 
director, and five other researchers are in a room that is being sealed off by a closing door. At the 
last minute, someone in the hall tries to make it to safety in the room by sliding under the closing 
door, but he is too late and the door closes on his arm, trapping him outside and making it 
impossible for him to get into the room. This also prevents the door from closing and allows 
water to rush into the room. 
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 If nothing is done, the water will flood the room and drown you and everyone else inside, 
including the person trapped under the door. The only way to save you and the other researchers 
is for the facility director to chop the trapped person’s arm off with an axe, leaving him out in the 
hallway where he will drown, allowing the door to close and preventing the room from flooding. 
 
Remote waterfall (Self version) 
 
 John, you, and your four children are hiking alongside a tropical river on your way to 
explore a remote waterfall. You have accidentally walked across a local river tribe’s sacred ritual 
site. 
 For this offence, tribal law says that all of you must be put to death. However, the leader 
of the tribe has decided that he will let John, you, and your three oldest children live if you 
yourself will sacrifice your youngest child by drowning her in a sacred river ceremony. 
 
Hospital Worker (Other version) 
 
 Your son is a patient in the hospital who needs an organ transplant. He and four other 
patients will soon die, each due to a different failing organ because there are no organs available 
to save them. There is another patient in the hospital who is in a coma on life support and her 
doctors agree that she will never wake up. 
 The only way that your son and the four other dying patients will live is if Fred, who 
works in the hospital, pulls the plug on the comatose patient’s life support machine, killing her so 
that her organs will be available for transplanting. If Fred does this, then the comatose patient 
will die and your dying son and the four other dying patients will receive their transplants and 
will be able to live. 
 
Sniper (Other version) 
 
 Tom is the sniper in a police SWAT team which is positioned outside of the office 
building where your daughter works. A terrorist has taken twenty people, including your 
daughter, hostage inside the building and is about to detonate a bomb, which would blow up the 
building, killing all of the hostages. 
 The only way to prevent the terrorist from blowing up the office building is for Tom to 
shoot him dead before he can detonate the bomb. The terrorist is protecting himself by holding 
your daughter hostage in front of him so that Tom must shoot and kill her in order to kill the 
terrorist. 
 
Antidote (Self version) 
 
 You are a scientist working in a small mountain village. A deadly substance has 
contaminated the local water supply and villagers are starting to get sick. Soon hundreds of 
villagers will be dead, including you. You have just created an antidote for this deadly substance, 
but have only one vial. You are taking the vial to your lab, where you can replicate the antidote 
and save yourself and the other villagers. 
 On your way to the lab you come across a villager who has already become very sick and 
will die if he does not immediately get the antidote. If you give this man the antidote, he will 
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survive and you will have no antidote left to replicate. As a result, there would be no way to save 
yourself and the other villagers. 
 
Space shuttle (Other version) 
 
 You and your son are astronauts onboard a space shuttle that is about to return from a 
visit to the moon. An explosion has caused the shuttle to lose most of its fuel supply. Even after 
dumping as much weight as possible off of the shuttle, there is still not enough fuel for the 
shuttle to make it back from the moon. If the shuttle does not get back soon it will run out of 
fuel, and everyone on board will die, including you, your son, and the other four astronauts. 
 One of the astronauts has become seriously ill and will not survive no matter what. If the 
captain of the shuttle dumps this fatally ill astronaut into outer space, there will be just enough 
fuel and the shuttle will carry the captain, you, your son, and the other two astronauts back from 
the moon safely. 
 
Desert burial (Self version) 
 
 You are a tour guide and are taking your two children to visit ancient ruins in the middle 
of the desert. You and your children have accidentally wandered into an off-limits tomb 
belonging to a local clan. 
 The clan’s law says that any children who are found in the off-limits tomb must be put to 
death. However, the elders of the clan have taken a liking to your children and have decided that 
they will let them live if you yourself will sacrifice a young child from the clan by burying her 
alive. 
 
 
Survey 2 
 
Bunker (Other version) 
 
 Joe is a military commander stationed in a sealed bunker deep underground. One of his 
soldiers contracted a deadly virus before entering the bunker, which is now sealed and cannot be 
opened. Joe is the only person in the bunker who has been vaccinated against this virus. If the 
infected soldier continues breathing the virus into the air then it will spread quickly, killing the 
other twenty soldiers in the bunker, except for Joe. 
 In order to prevent the deadly virus from spreading, Joe must shoot dead the infected 
soldier, which will stop him from breathing the virus into the air. 
 
Hot air balloon (Self version) 
 
 You are a hot air balloon pilot flying a group of ten sightseers high in the air on a hot air 
balloon ride. You realize that the balloon is carrying more people than it was designed to carry 
and is beginning to strain under the weight. The balloon will soon fall sending you and the 
sightseers plummeting to the ground, killing you all. 
 If nothing is done, the balloon will crash and you and everyone else on board will fall to 
your deaths. However, you know that there is an elderly woman on board who will die from a 
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terminal illness within a week. If you throw that woman off of the hot air balloon, the balloon 
will not fall and you and the other eight sightseers will make it down to the ground safely. 
 
Firefighter Bucket (Other version) 
 
 A firefighter has just rescued you, your child, and your two neighbors from the 15th floor 
of your burning apartment building. He has deposited the four of you at the top of his fire truck’s 
ladder, which is lowering you down to safety. There is too much weight on the ladder, and it 
begins to break. 
 If nothing is done, the ladder will break, and you, your child, and your neighbors will fall 
15 stories and be instantly killed. If your one neighbor pushes your other neighbor, who happens 
to be very large, off of the ladder, this will prevent the ladder from breaking so that you, your 
child, and your one neighbor can be brought down safely. 
 
Agonizing choice (Self version) 
 
 You and your three children are inmates in a concentration camp. Your youngest child 
has tried to escape from the camp. To make an example of her a guard is going to hang her in the 
middle of the camp. 
 He has stood her up on a chair and put a noose around her neck. The guard has told you 
to hang her by pulling the chair out from underneath her feet, causing her to fall and be strangled 
to death. If you do not hang her, the guard has decided he will personally hang her and your two 
other children. 
 
Seaside Cave (Self version) 
 
 You are a geologist who is exploring a tiny cave on a secluded coastline with a group of 
ten of your colleagues. You are the first person to exit the cave, and the person behind you gets 
stuck in the entrance, trapping the rest of the group inside the cave. In a short time high tide will 
be upon the cave. 
 The person cannot be pulled from the cave entrance no matter how hard you try, and 
unless he is unstuck, he and the rest of the group, except for you, will drown. You have brought 
with you a stick of dynamite. If you use the dynamite to blow the person from the entrance, the 
person will be blown to pieces and the other geologists will be able to escape the cave safely. 
Since you are already outside of the cave, you will be safe no matter what. 
 
Crying baby 2 (Other version) 
 
 Your apartment building has just been taken over by a local militia. They have orders to 
kill anyone they find inside. When the militia took over, you were painting your kitchen while 
your neighbor Judy watched your baby. Judy (who is holding your baby) and eight other 
neighbors have taken cover in a dark hidden attic. You made it to the attic just in time to hide, 
and outside you hear the militia searching the apartment for valuables. 
 Your baby begins to cry loudly. Judy covers his mouth to block the sound. If she removes 
her hand from his mouth his crying will get the attention of the militia, who will kill Judy, your 
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baby, you and the others hiding in the attic. If Judy is to save herself, you, and the other 
neighbors, she must continue covering your baby’s mouth until she smothers him to death. 
 
Mountain Climbing (Self version) 
 
 You are leading a climbing expedition, which includes your son, up a frozen 
mountaintop. A climber attached to the same rope as you, your son, and another person is falling 
off the side of a cliff, but you grab her hand as she falls. 
 The weight of the fallen climber begins to drag you, your son, and the other person off of 
the cliff. If you do nothing, the three of you will be pulled over the cliff by the fallen climber and 
you will all plummet to your deaths. The only way for you to save yourself, your son, and the 
other person is to let go of the fallen climber’s hand, dropping her to her death. 
 
Mine 2 (Other version) 
 
 Your grown-up children work in a small underground mine. A dam near the mine has 
burst, sending water rushing toward the mine. If nothing is done, the water will flood the section 
of the mine where your children and eight other miners are working, causing them all to drown. 
 The mine manager is safe in his office, and the only way for him to avoid the deaths of 
your children and the other miners working in the mine is to radio a worker who is safe outside 
the mine and order her to seal off the mine from the outside. If the manager does this, the worker 
will not be able to get to safety before the water comes and she will be swept away just outside 
the mine and killed. 
